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Introduction 
 
A reciprocal relation between attention and awareness is crucial for adaptive behavior. 
However, for investigating these relationships could be important to take into 
consideration the different components that constitute the attentional system. According 
to Posner and Petersen’ model (Posner, 1994; Posner and Petersen, 1990), three different 
cognitive functions could be distinguished in human attention which are sub-served by 
three independent (although coordinated) neural systems: alerting responses, orienting to 
sensory stimulation and executive control of performance. The Alerting network is aimed 
at achieving and maintaining a state of high sensitivity to incoming stimuli and is related 
to the performance in tasks that involve both phasic and tonic alertness; the Orienting 
network is involved in the selection of information from the sensory input; the Executive 
control network is defined as involving the mechanisms for resolving cognitive conflict. 
As mindfulness meditation has been described as “the intentional cultivation of a non-
judgmentally awareness that arise through paying attention, on purpose, in the present 
moment” (Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Kabat-Zinn, 2003), a putative candidate mechanism for its 
effects is a modification in attentional processing. This doctoral dissertation analyses the 
influence of mindfulness meditation on attentional performance. More specifically, in 
Chapter 1, theories and models of attention are introduced subdivided in four macro areas: 
Selective attention, Divided attention, Search and Signal detection and vigilance. In 
addition, Posner’s model of attention is presented as the main core of this final work. This 
model, one of the most influent in attention literature, postulates that distinct areas of the 
brain underlie distinct attentional processes. In 2002, Fan and collaborators developed the 
Attention Network Test (ANT) in order to measure these attentional functions separately. 
Finally, a series of evolutions of this task, that have been proposed and developed in the 
last decades, are described in detail. In Chapter 2, mindfulness definition is introduced 
together with its historical background. Buddhist roots and Western Psychology overlap 
in theory and practice. Operational definition and the three-component model of 
mindfulness are important constructs that permit us to specify each component in terms 
of speciﬁc behaviors, experiential manifestations, and implicated psychological processes 
(Bishop et al., 2004). Furthermore, in Western world, mindfulness-based interventions 
are becoming widely accepted methods of addressing the symptoms associated with 
many commonly experienced mental health problems and/or emotional disorders. 
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Although these approaches involve mindfulness techniques, there are small differences 
between each modality that are here described in detail. Moreover, self-report 
assessments of mindfulness are convenient and efficient and can provide reliable and 
valid information if they are well constructed for the populations in which they will be 
used. The most important mindfulness questionnaires are described, highlighting the 
assessment used in this dissertation: the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; 
Baer et al., 2006). Finally, neuroscience of mindfulness is introduced as a new way to 
explore whether and how our brain is affected by this kind of practice. In Chapter 3, two 
experiments are presented. The main goal of Experiment 1 is to investigate attention 
improvements of Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction training (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 
1990) compared to a Control group, using the Attention Network Test for Interactions-
Vigilance (ANTI-V; Roca et al., 2011), that includes a direct measure of executive 
vigilance together with the classical attentional networks, introduced above, with the 
intent to better understand awareness strategies used by our attentional system. The aim 
of Experiment 2 is to assess the relationship between mindfulness facets of FFMQ and 
the Attention Network Test for Interactions-Vigilance. In Chapter 4, two more 
experiments are presented. The main goal of Experiment 3 is to replicate results from 
Luna et al., (In preparation). The authors designed a task (Attention Network Test for 
Interactions and Vigilance - executive and arousal components (ANTI-Vea) that could 
measure simultaneously the functioning of the typical attentional networks (phasic 
alertness, orienting and executive control), together with two different components of 
vigilance (executive –detection of infrequent signals-, and arousal –immediate reaction 
without response control-). The aim of Experiment 4 is to investigate whether and how 
FFMQ mindfulness facets interacts with attentional performance using ANTI-Vea task. 
Finally, a general discussion is presented. The general discussion focuses on overall 
results from the four experiments introduced above together with limitations and future 
directions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
Chapter 1 
The nature of attention 
 
1.1. Theories and models of attention 
         In Principles of Psychology William James defines attention as: 
 
                     “[Attention] is the taking possession of the mind, in clear and vivid form, 
of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible objects or trains 
                    of thoughts. … It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal 
                        effectively with others” 
 
Attention refers to how we actively process specific information in our environment from 
the enormous amount of stimuli available through our senses, our stored memories, and 
our other cognitive processes (De Weerd, 2003a; Rao, 2003). Attention allows us to use 
our limited mental resources judiciously. By dimming the lights on many stimuli from 
outside (sensations) and inside (thoughts and memories), we can highlight the stimuli that 
interest us. This heightened focus increases the likelihood that we can respond speedily 
and accurately to interesting stimuli. Literature reports four functions of attention: 
selective attention, divided attention, search, signal detection and vigilance. Each of these 
functions have its neuroscientific studies and explanatory models. For instance, when we 
talk about selective attention we refer to our capacity to attend to some stimuli and ignore 
others, as when we pay attention on reading and ignore such stimuli as a nearby TV 
program; divided attention is the capacity to allocate our available attentional resources 
on performing more than one task, as when we are driving and listening to the radio at 
the same time; search is when we try to find a signal among distractors, as when we are 
finding our keys in our bag and signal detection and vigilance refer to our capacity to 
detect the appearance of a particular stimulus, as when air traffic controllers keep an eye 
on all traffic near and over the airport.  
 
1.1.1. Selective attention 
There are several theories studied selective attention belonging to the group of “filter” 
theories or “bottleneck” theories. A filter blocks some of information going through and 
thereby selects only a part of a total information to pass through to the next stage. A 
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bottleneck slows down information passing through. According to one of the earliest 
theory of attention, we filter information right after we notice it at the sensory level 
(Broadbent, 1958). Broadbent’s model argued that information from all of the stimuli 
presented at any given time enters a sensory buffer. One of the inputs is then selected on 
the basis of its physical characteristics for further processing by being allowed to pass 
through a filter. Because we have only a limited capacity to process information, this filter 
is designed to prevent the information processing system from becoming overloaded. The 
inputs not initially selected by the filter remain briefly in the sensory buffer, and if they 
are not processed they decay rapidly. Broadbent assumed that the filter rejected the non-
shadowed or attended message at an early stage of processing. Hence, Broadbent’s model 
suggests that the selection of material to attend to (that is, the filtering) is made early, 
before semantic analysis. Broadbent’s theory was supported by Colin Cherry’s findings 
that sensory information sometimes may be noticed by an attended ear if it does not have 
to be processed elaborately (e.g., you may notice that the voice in your unattended ear 
switches to a tone) but information requiring higher perceptual processes is not noticed if 
not attended to (e.g., you would likely not notice that the language in your unattended ear 
switches from English to German). Instead, for selective filter models (Moray, 1959; 
Wood & Cowan, 1995) the selective filter blocks out most information at the sensory 
level. But some personally important messages are so powerful that they burst through 
the filtering mechanism. Anne Treisman proposed her selective attention theory in 1964. 
Her theory is based on the earlier model by Broadbent. Treisman also believed that this 
human filter selects sensory inputs on the basis of physical characteristics. However, she 
argued that the unattended sensory inputs (the ones that were not chosen by the filter and 
remain in the sensory buffer) are attenuated by the filter rather than eliminated. In 
Attenuation model (Treisman, 1964), attenuation is a process in which the unselected 
sensory inputs are processed in decreased intensity. For instance, if you selectively attend 
to a ringing phone in a room where there's TV, a crying baby, and people talking, the later 
three sound sources are attenuated or decreased in volume. However, when the baby's cry 
goes louder, you may turn your attention to the baby because the sound input is still there, 
not lost. Treisman’s selective attention theory involves a later filtering mechanism. 
Instead of blocking stimuli out, the filter merely weakens (attenuates) the strength of 
stimuli other than the target stimulus step by step. Deutsch and Deutsch (1963; Norman, 
1968) developed a model, in which the location of the filter is even later, which explained 
that all information, both attended and unattended, undergo analysis for meaning. After 
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such analysis, selection of a sensory input takes place. One factor that has a major effect 
on selecting the input is the relevance of the information during the time of processing. 
They suggested that stimuli are filtered out only after they have been analyzed for both 
their physical properties and their meaning. This later filtering would allow people to 
recognize information entering the unattended ear. For example, they might recognize the 
sound of their own names or a translation of attended input (for bilinguals). Both early 
and late selection theories have data to support them. In his influential book Cognitive 
Psychology (1967), Ulric Neisser proposed that the whole idea of a "filter" was wrong. It 
was too passive, suggesting that the cognitive system sits back and receives information 
without seeking it out. If we view the thought process as a construction, then selective 
attention results from what we seek, not what we fail to filter out. Neisser synthesized the 
early-filter and the late-filter models and proposed that there are two processes governing 
attention: pre-attentive processes and attentive, controlled processes. The first ones are 
rapid and occur in parallel. They can be used to notice only physical sensory 
characteristics of the unattended message. But they do not discern meaning or 
relationships. The last ones occur later. They are executed serially and consume time and 
attentional resources, such as working memory. They also can be used to observe 
relationships among features. They serve to synthesize fragments into a mental 
representation of an object. A two-step model could account for Cherry’s, Moray’s, and 
Treisman’s data. The model also nicely incorporates aspects of Treisman’s signal-
attenuation theory and of her subsequent feature-integration theory. This theory has 
become very influential (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Schmidt, 1982). The 
author suggested that the individual features that make up an object (its color, motion, 
orientation, and so on) are encoded separately and in parallel by pre-attentive cognitive 
mechanisms. However, in order to perceive a whole object, the observer needs to ‘glue 
together’ (or integrate) these separate features, using visual attention. The feature-
detection process may be linked to the former of the two processes (i.e., speedy, automatic 
processing). Her feature-integration process may be linked to the latter of the two 
processes (i.e., slower, controlled processing). These early theories of attention are all 
related to the selection of a subset of sensory information due to a limited capacity for 
information processing. One early model featured a “Supervisory Attention System” to 
account for the willed and automatic control of behavior (Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
Cognitive control is a top-down modulation of cognitive processes based on higher-order 
representations such as goals or plans. Also called executive control, this process can 
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inhibit automatic responses and influence working memory. Cognitive control supports 
flexible, adaptive responses and complex goal-directed thought. According to this model, 
willed and automatic actions are controlled at different levels depending on the degree of 
task difficulty and complexity. When the action involves a well-learned, rehearsed or 
automatic response, the control operates at a lower level (contention scheduling 
mechanism) and an appropriate action/response is selected by lateral inhibition of 
competing response sequences (schemas). When the action/response is novel or complex, 
an additional system (supervisory system) is required for selection of a desired response 
sequence. Attention can thus be thought of as subserving cognitive control by modulating 
information processing in a goal-consistent manner, via the attentional functions. Further, 
in her Perceptual Load Theory (1995) Lavie suggested that the locus of selection is 
dependent on the perceptual load (amount of potentially task-relevant information) of the 
task in question. When the perceptual load of a task is low, and does not exceed perceptual 
capacity, distractors are processed (late selection). However, when the perceptual load of 
a task is high, irrelevant distractors are not processed (early selection). In other words, 
when perceptual load is low, there is a need for cognitive control mechanisms to maintain 
an adequate level of task performance (Lavie et al., 2004). Thus, attention, apart from 
selection processes, also incorporates elements of flexibility required for adjusting the 
efforts to tackle a task more effectively (Lavie & Cox, 1997). This flexibility seems to 
depend on emotion and awareness. 
 
1.1.2. Divided attention 
In order to understand our ability to divide our attention, researchers have developed 
capacity models of attention. These models help to explain how we can perform more 
than one attention-demanding task at a time. There are two different kinds: one kind of 
model suggests that there is one single pool of attentional resources that can be divided 
freely, and the other model suggests that there are multiple sources of attention (McDowd, 
2007). Kahneman’s model of divided attention (Kahneman, 1973) is based around the 
idea of mental efforts. This is a description of how demanding the processing of a 
particular input might be. Some tasks might be relatively automatic (in that they make 
few demands in terms of mental effort) despite the fact they have a high information load. 
Therefore, Kahneman proposes that some activities are more demanding (and therefore 
require more mental effort than others); the total available processing capacities may be 
increased or decreased by other factors such as arousal. Arousal is a degree of 
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physiological excitation, responsivity, and readiness for action, relative to a baseline. For 
Kahneman, arousal has a determining effect on performance. Extreme states of arousal 
can degrade performance, as it permits too many distractions. Several activities can be 
carried out at the same time, provided that their total effort does not exceed the available 
capacity and rules or strategies exist which determine allocation of resources to various 
activities and to various stages of processing. Attentional capacity will, therefore, reflect 
the demands made at the perceptual level, the level at which the input is interpreted or 
committed to memory and the response selection stage. Attentional-resources theory has 
been criticized severely as overly broad and vague (e.g., Navon, 1984). Filter and 
bottleneck theories of attention seem to be more suitable metaphors for competing tasks 
that appear to be attentionally incompatible, like selective-attention tasks or simple 
divided-attention tasks. Although attentional-resources theory is more adequate at 
explaining divided attention among simple tasks, multiple resources theory is another, 
more accurate metaphor for explaining divided attention on complex tasks. Multiple 
resources theory states that as each complex task is automatized, performing that task 
requires less of the individual's limited-capacity attentional resources (Sternberg, Robert 
J.; Sternberg, Karin (2012). Cognitive Psychology (Textbook)).  
 
1.1.3. Search 
Another important line of investigations is about search. Search refers to a scan of the 
environment for particular features—actively looking for something when you are not 
sure where it will appear. Visual search is the common task of looking for something in 
a cluttered visual environment. The item that the observer is searching for is termed the 
target, while non-target items are termed distractors. The number of targets and 
distractors affects the difficulty of the task. Display size is the number of items in a given 
visual array (it does not refer to the size of the items or even the size of the field on which 
the array is displayed.). The display-size effect is the degree to which the number of items 
in a display hinders (slows down) the search process. When studying visual-search 
phenomena, investigators often manipulate the display size. They then observe how 
various contributing factors increase or decrease the display-size effect. Distracters cause 
more trouble under some conditions than under others. Suppose we look for an item with 
a distinct feature like color or shape. We conduct a feature search, in which we simply 
scan the environment for that feature (Treisman, 1993; Weidner & Mueller, 2009). 
Instead, in a conjunction search, we look for a particular combination (conjunction-
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joining together) of features. In the last decades, three theories tried to explain search 
processes: feature-integration theory, similarity theory, and guided search theory. Anne 
Treisman’s Feature Integration Theory (FIT), first proposed in 1980, holds that attention 
is critical to the formation of bound representations of objects and, by extension, it 
proposes that attention is critical to our conscious experience of those bound 
representations. In FIT the visual system first decomposes the visual scene into its 
composite features, arrayed in a set of ‘feature maps’. The pre-attentive description of a 
scene or object comprises a list of such features. The term ‘pre-attentive’ has been 
controversial, but it can be operationally defined here as the representation of a stimulus 
before selective attention is directed to that stimulus. In FIT, the approximate position of 
each feature is recorded on its pre-attentive feature map. For example, if the visual scene 
contains two red objects, the feature map corresponding to redness would be activated at 
two points roughly corresponding to the locations of the red objects. If each feature were 
associated with a precise region in space, this might solve the binding problem. Features 
that correspond to the same region in space could be automatically conjoined, thus 
guaranteeing veridical perception. There is some neuropsychological support for 
Treisman’s model. For example, Nobel laureates David Hubel & Torsten Wiesel (1979) 
identified specific neural feature detectors. These are cortical neurons that respond 
differentially to visual stimuli of particular orientations (e.g., vertical, horizontal, or 
diagonal). More recent research has indicated that the best search strategy is not for the 
brain to increase the activity of neurons that respond to the particular target stimuli; in 
fact, the brain seems to use the more nearly optimal strategy of activating neurons that 
best distinguish between the target and distracters while at the same time ignoring the 
neurons that are tuned best to the target (Navalpakkam & Itti, 2007; Pouget & Bavelier, 
2007). Duncan & Humphreys (1989) investigated search performance for the letters L 
and T presented at various orientations. They found that in addition to target-background 
similarity, a major factor determining search efficiency is the similarity among the 
background elements. Thus, searching for upright L among inverted Ls is markedly easy 
than searching for that same target among Ls presented at several orientations. This effect 
of background homogeneity interacts with target-background similarity; it produces a 
marginal effect when the target is clearly distinguishable from the background, but 
become increasingly important as the target and distractors become more similar. To 
account for these findings, Duncan and Humphreys formulated a Similarity Theory of 
visual search. The theory holds that response times for detecting a target are not 
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influenced by display size as long as non-target items attract no resources. Otherwise, 
increasing the number of non-targets will be harmful, because it reduces resource 
availability for the target. The more closely a non-target matches a target template, the 
greater the amount of resources devoted to it. Thus, the more similar the target and 
distractors are, the less efficient is the search for the target. Furthermore, the more 
heterogeneous the distractors, the less likely is it that a simple target description will 
exclude them all. More elaborate descriptions should lead to poorer selection, either 
because of the complexity required for the matching operation or because the more 
attributes the template needs to possess the more likely it is to share attributes with each 
non-target, consequently disrupting selective search. Finally, Guided Search Theory 
(Cave & Wolfe, 1990; Wolfe, 2007) is an intellectual heir of FIT. According to this 
model, the initial processing of basic features produces an activation map, in which each 
of the items in the visual display has its own level of activation. Suppose you were 
searching for red, horizontal targets. Feature processing would activate all red objects and 
all horizontal objects. Attention is then directed towards items on the basis of their level 
of activation, starting with those with the highest level of activation. It follows that 
distractors sharing at least one feature with the target are activated and slow down visual 
search, which is what was found by Treisman & Sato (1990). A problem with the original 
version of feature integration theory was that targets in large display are typical found 
faster than predicted. The activation-map notion provides a plausible way in which visual 
search can be made more efficients: stimuli not sharing any features with the target 
stimulus are ignored because they receive little or no activation.  
 
1.1.4. Signal detection and vigilance 
What if we have to discriminate between target (signal) and noise as well as when we do 
so for prolonged periods during which the stimulus is absent? Signal Detection Theory 
(SDT) evolved from the development of communications and radar equipment the first 
half of this century.  It migrated to psychology, initially as part of sensation and 
perception, in the 50's and 60's as an attempt to understand some of the features of human 
behavior when detecting very faint stimuli that were not being explained by traditional 
theories of thresholds. From the beginning of the discipline, psychologists were interested 
in measuring our sensory sensitivity, how well we detect stimuli. The leading theory was 
that there was a threshold, a minimum value below which people could not detect a 
stimulus. The only problem was that no firm threshold could be established. Some people 
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heard a faint background noise easily, while others completely missed loud noises nearby. 
The results were simply too inconsistent for there to be a standard threshold. So, 
researchers started looking for a new explanation. What they found was that the sensory 
sensitivity was a relationship between the strength of the signal and the level of alertness, 
and thus, signal detection theory was born. When we try to detect a target stimulus 
(signal), there are four possible outcomes: if a stimulus is presented and the person says 
yes, the trial is a “hit”. If no stimulus is presented but the person still says yes, it is a “false 
alarm” (FA) and might indicate that the subject is motivated to guess. If a stimulus is 
presented and the person says no, it is a “miss” (d’) and gives information on the subject's 
ability to detect the stimulus. Finally, if no stimulus is presented and the person says no, 
it is a “correct rejection” (β). The relative frequency of these four types of response are 
not all independent. For example when the signal is present the proportion of Hits and the 
proportion of Misses add up to one (because when the signal is present the subject can 
say either Yes or No). Likewise when the signal is absent, the proportion of FA and the 
proportion of Correct Rejection add up to one. Therefore all the information is given by 
the proportion of Hits and FAs. Even though the proportions of Hits and FAs provide all 
the information in the data, these values are hard to interpret because they crucially 
depend upon two parameters. The first parameter is the difficulty of the task: the easier 
the task the larger the proportion of Hits and the smaller the proportion of FAs. When the 
task is easy, we say that the signal and the noise are well separated, or that there is a large 
distance between the signal and the noise (conversely, for a hard task, the signal and the 
noise are close and the distance between them is small). The second parameter is the 
strategy of the participant: a participant who always says No will never commit a FA; on 
the other hand, a participant who always says Yes is guaranteed all Hits. A participant 
who tends to give the response Yes is called liberal and a participant who tends to give 
the response No is called conservative (Abdi, 2007). The concept of Vigilance (also called 
sustained attention or tonic alert) is highly related to SDT. Vigilance refers to a person’s 
ability to attend to a field of stimulation over a prolonged period, during which the person 
seeks to detect the appearance of a particular target stimulus of interest. The study of 
vigilance has expanded since the 1940s mainly due to the increased interaction of people 
with machines for applications involving monitoring and detection of rare events and 
weak signals. Such applications include air traffic control, inspection and quality control, 
automated navigation, military and border surveillance, and lifeguarding. The systematic 
study of vigilance was initiated by Norman Mackworth during World War II. Mackworth 
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authored "The breakdown of vigilance during prolonged visual search" in 1948 and this 
paper is the seminal publication on vigilance. Mackworth's 1948 study investigated the 
tendency of radar and sonar operators to miss rare irregular event detections near the end 
of their watch. Mackworth simulated rare irregular events on a radar display by having 
the test participants watch an unmarked clock face over a 2-hour period. A single clock 
hand moved in small equal increments around the clock face, with the exception of 
occasional larger jumps. This device became known as the Mackworth Clock. 
Participants were tasked to report when they detected the larger jumps. Mackworth's 
results indicated a decline in signal detection over time, known as a vigilance decrement. 
The participants' event detection declined between 10 and 15 percent in the first 30 
minutes and then continued to decline more gradually for the remaining 90 minutes. 
Mackworth's method became known as the "Clock Test" and this method has been 
employed in subsequent investigations. Vigilance decrement is defined as "deterioration 
in the ability to remain vigilant for critical signals with time, as indicated by a decline in 
the rate of the correct detection of signals" (Parasuraman, 1986). Vigilance decrement is 
most commonly associated with monitoring to detect a weak target signal. Detection 
performance loss is less likely to occur in cases where the target signal exhibits a high 
saliency. For example, a radar operator would be unlikely to miss a rare target at the end 
of a watch if it were a large bright flashing signal, but might miss a small dim signal. 
Under most conditions, vigilance decrement becomes significant within the first 15 
minutes of attention (Teichner, 1974), but a decline in detection performance can occur 
more quickly if the task demand conditions are high (Helton et al., 2007). This occurs in 
both experienced and novice task performers (Mackie, 1984). Vigilance had traditionally 
been associated with low cognitive demand and vigilance decrement with a decline in 
arousal pursuant to the low cognitive demand (Frankmann & Adams, 1962), but these 
views are no longer widely held. More recent studies indicate that vigilance is hard work, 
requiring the allocation of significant cognitive resources, and inducing significant levels 
of stress (Parasuraman & Davies, 1977). 
 
1.2. Posner’s model of attention 
         For about a century thereafter, several theoretical models of attention have been put 
forward, one of which is that by Posner and Petersen. First of all, authors argued that they 
are three basic concepts about the attention system. The first is that the attention system 
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is anatomically separate from processing systems, which handle incoming stimuli, make 
decisions, and produce outputs. The second concept is that attention utilizes a network of 
anatomical areas. The third is that these anatomical areas carry out different functions 
that can be specified in cognitive terms. According to Posner and collaborators’ model, 
three different cognitive functions could be distinguished in human attention, which are 
sub-served by three independent (although coordinated) neural systems. First, the 
alertness network involves some fronto-parietal regions, mainly in the right hemisphere, 
and also some brain stem areas such as the locus coeruleus (Posner, 2008). This neural 
circuit is aimed at achieving and maintaining a state of high sensitivity to incoming 
stimuli and is related to the performance in tasks that involve both phasic and tonic 
alertness (see, for example, Posner, 2008; Sturm and Willmes, 2001). Second, the 
orienting network includes different areas of the parietal and frontal lobes, and it is 
involved in the selection of information from the sensory input (Fan et al., 2002). Third, 
the executive control network activates anterior areas of the frontal cortex, such as the 
anterior cingulate and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This network is defined as 
involving the mechanisms for resolving cognitive conflict, and it could be efficiently 
assessed with the use of Stroop, Simon or flanker tasks (see, for example, Fan et al., 
2002). Each of these networks is described below separately (Figure 1). 
 
1.2.1. Alerting 
          As it has been suggested, one approach to the study of alerting is to use a warning 
signal prior to a target event to produce a phasic change in alertness (Petersen and Posner, 
2012). When the warning cue appears there is a change from the resting state to a new 
state that involves preparation for detecting and responding to an expected signal. If the 
target requires a speeded response reaction time improves following a warning. This 
improvement is not due to a different information of the target, which is not changed by 
the warning signal, but to the change of speed in orienting attention and thus responding 
to the signal. Several approaches have been used to the study of tonic alertness. A long 
established approach to tonic alertness is to use a long and usually rather boring task to 
measure sustained vigilance. Vigilance tasks rely heavily on mechanisms of the right 
cerebral cortex (Posner & Petersen 1990). In the classic lesion data as well as in more 
recent imaging data there is the confirmation that tonic alertness is strongly lateralized to 
the right hemisphere. Our comprehension of the physiology and pharmacology 
underlying the alerting system has changed significantly. There is a strong evidence 
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relating the neuromodulator norepinephrine (NE) to the alerting system. Locus coeruleus, 
the source of NE, is the brain area activated by a warning signal (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 
2005). The changes during the time between warning and target reflect a suppression of 
ongoing activity thought to prepare the system for a rapid response. Contingent negative 
variation (CNV) (Walter, 1964) is a negative shift in scalp-recorded EEG, which often 
begins with the warning signal and may remain until there is the presentation of the target. 
In part, this negativity could arise from anterior cingulate and adjacent structures (Nagai 
et al., 2004) and may overlap the event-related response to the warning stimulus. An 
extensive imaging study (Sturm & Willmes, 2001) showed that a large common right 
hemisphere and thalamic set of areas are involved in both phasic and tonic alerting. Other 
imaging study, however, suggested that the warning signal effects rely more strongly on 
left cerebral hemisphere mechanisms (Coull et al., 2000; Fan et al., 2005). These 
differences in laterality found in tonic and phasic studies are still to reconcile. 
 
1.2.2. Orienting 
          The orienting network is focused on the ability to prioritize sensory input by 
selecting a modality or location. Imaging literature, now, points out that anterior as 
posterior brain areas are involved in orienting. For example, human and animal studies 
have implicated the frontal eye fields (FEF) in this process (Corbetta et al., 1998; 
Thompson et al., 2005). In addition, also parietal areas have been implicated in related 
forms of processing. A series of imaging experiments by Corbetta & Schulman (2002) 
using cuing methodology in combination with event-related fMRI indicate two brain 
systems related to external stimuli. A more dorsal system including the FEFs and the 
interparietal sulcus followed presentation of an arrow cue and was identified with rapid 
strategic control over attention. When the target was miscued, subjects had to break their 
focus of attention on the cued location and switch to the target location. The 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the ventral frontal cortex were involved in the switch 
and the latter was identified with the interrupt signal that allowed the switch to occur. 
Parietal regions were included in the ventral system but added a small set of frontal 
locations as well, particularly in the FEFs. In literature, some authors have argued that 
covert attention shifts are linked to the saccadic eye movement system (Rizzolatti et al., 
1987), and neuroimaging studies using fMRI have shown that covert and overt shifts of 
attention involve similar areas (Corbetta et al., 1998). It is important, now, to connect the 
imaging and physiological results with other studies to provide more details on local 
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computations. One strategy could be studying the pharmacology of each of the attention 
networks. For example, cholinergic systems arising in the basal forebrain appear to play 
a critical role in orienting; lesions of the basal forebrain in monkeys interfere with 
orienting attention (Voytko et al., 1994). Rat studies and monkey studies have been 
confirmed same observations: only the cholinergic system influence the orienting 
response (Everitt & Robbins, 1997; Stewart et al., 2001). The more ventral network 
including the TPJ seemed to be more active following the target and was thus identified 
as part of a network responsive to sensory events. Brain areas involved in orienting to 
visual stimuli seem to overlap strongly (within fMRI resolution) with those involved with 
orienting to stimuli in other modalities (Driver et al., 2004). Finally, anatomically the 
source of the orienting effect lies in the network of parietal, frontal, and subcortical areas 
mentioned above. The influence of attention is on the bottom-up signals arriving in 
sensory-specific areas. Attention to a target seems to reduce the influence of other 
competing stimuli. 
 
1.2.3. Executive Control          
          In Posner et al., (1990), executive control was presented with the heading of target 
detection. Although it is possible to monitor for targets in many processing streams 
without too much difficulty, the moment of target detection produces interference across 
the system, slowing detection of another target (Duncan, 1980). Focal attention is a set of 
processes related to the limited capacity of attentional system and to awareness. Focal 
attentions may involve widespread connections from the midline cortex and the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) to produce the global work space frequently associated with 
consciousness (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011). There is a strong association of target 
detection and awareness of the target with the medial frontal cortex and the adjacent ACC. 
Anterior cingulate cortex and related regions have been reliably activated when there is 
conflict. Focal attention explanation comes from activity found in the medial 
frontal/anterior cingulate in such diverse operations as perception of either physical 
(Rainville et al., 1997) or social (Eisenberger et al., 2003) pain, processing of reward 
(Hampton & O’Doherty 2007), monitoring or resolution of conflict (Botvinick et al., 
2001), error detection (Dehaene et al., 1994), and theory of mind (Kampe et al., 2003). 
Some authors suggested that activity found during the performance of tasks was related 
to focal attention because trial-related activity in these regions was greater for targets than 
for nontargets, for conflict more than for nonconflict trials, and for errors more than for 
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correct trials. Neuroimaging gives us strong evidence that conflict tasks such as the Stroop 
effect activate common areas of the anterior cingulate gyrus: the dorsal portion for more 
strictly cognitive tasks and the ventral area for emotion-related tasks (Botvinick et al., 
2001; Bush et al., 2000). The common involvement of the anterior cingulate in attention 
and both emotion and cognitive control has provided one basis for the argument that the 
executive attention network is critical to these various functions. Both behavioral and 
resting state functional data suggest substantial development of the executive attention 
network between infancy and childhood. Although conflict resolution has been studied 
widely with normals, the anatomy of other functions remains to be thoroughly explored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Anatomy of three attentional networks: alerting, orienting, and executive 
control (from Posner & Rothbart, 2007) 
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1.3. From ANT to ANTI-Vea: measuring attentional networks and 
vigilance 
           Alerting, orienting, and executive control are widely thought to be relatively 
independent aspects of attention that are linked to separable brain regions. In 2002, Fan 
and colleagues developed the Attention Network Test (ANT), based on a widely 
renowned neurocognitive model of human attention: the three attentional networks model 
proposed by Mike Posner and collaborators. The ANT combines Cued Reaction Time 
Task (CRRT; Posner, 1980) and Flanker Task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) to differentiate 
independent attention components in one paradigm and has been widely employed in 
brain functional (Kellermann et al., 2011; Neuhaus et al., 2010), developmental (Ishigami 
et al., 2011; Konrad et al., 2005), genetic (Fossella et al., 2002; Posner et al., 2007), and 
psychiatric investigations (Adólfsdóttir et al., 2008; Bush, 2010) to test normal and 
abnormal attention abilities. The manipulations of cue and flanker type allow the 
calculation of response time (RT) difference scores assumed to represent the three 
attention networks. Participants indicate the direction of a central arrow that is ﬂanked by 
four arrows (two per side) pointing in the same direction as the central arrow (congruent 
condition) or in the opposite direction (incongruent condition); in the neutral condition, 
either straight lines ﬂank the central arrow or the central arrow is presented alone, 
depending on the study. The arrows are preceded by one of three types of cues (center 
cue, double cue, spatially informative cue; all of which are temporally informative) or no 
cue (a temporally uninformative condition). The center and double cues indicate that the 
arrow stimulus will occur soon, and the spatially informative cue is 100% predictive of 
target location. The ANT provides two measures of performance, response time (RT) and 
error rate (ER), and the three network scores are calculable within each of these measures. 
The alerting network score is calculated by subtracting the double cue conditions from 
the no cue conditions. These cue conditions are used because the double cue provides 
temporal information regarding the upcoming flanker display that the no cue condition 
does not, but both cue conditions are thought to represent a diffuse allocation of attention. 
The orienting network score is calculated by subtracting the valid cue condition from the 
center cue condition. The valid cue captures attention to the appropriate stimulus location 
for the upcoming flanker display, but in the center cue condition, attention will have to 
move to the flanker display when it appears either above or below fixation. The executive 
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control network score is calculated by subtracting the congruent flanker condition from 
the incongruent condition. The distractors surrounding the center target in the incongruent 
condition result in more interference in the response selection process compared to the 
congruent condition. In the original report on the ANT, Fan and colleagues observed no 
significant correlations between any of the attention network scores (Figure 2). Hence, in 
2004, Callejas and collaborators developed the Attention Network Test for Interactions 
(ANTI), a variation of the original ANT that provides more independent measures of the 
phasic alertness and orienting scores. To achieve this objective, the ANTI includes an 
auditory warning signal (instead of a visual cue) to independently assess phasic alertness. 
Also, the visual cues used to evaluate attentional orienting are not predictive of the 
location of the forthcoming targets, and thus only exogenous orienting attention is 
involved. The ANTI task allows a more independent testing of the three attentional 
networks, allows also measuring the interactions between the attentional networks and 
usually provides more reliable scores, particularly for phasic alertness. Although the three 
attentional networks are independent and based on different brain networks, they are 
acting in a constant mutual influence in order to produce efficient and adaptive behavior 
when their functioning is measured in a complex task. A further version of ANTI (Rueda 
et al, 2004) is a child-friendly version of ANT (using fishes instead of arrows) modified 
to study the development of the networks in children. In 2011, Roca and collaborators 
developed the Attention Network Test for Interactions and Vigilance (ANTI-V), a further 
variation of the ANTI in which a measure of vigilance is added. This measure evaluates 
tonic alertness (i.e., the ability to detect infrequent, unpredictable and unexpected stimuli) 
and it is obtained in addition to the usual phasic alertness, orienting and executive control 
scores. This new task provided a direct measure of vigilance. Participants were asked to 
detect infrequent targets by pressing a different key on the keyboard in order to test 
specific hypothesis on vigilance. At the same time, ANTI-V helped interpreting the phasic 
alertness score, since similar high phasic alertness scores can be associated with either an 
increased efficiency using warning signals or a decreased ability to maintain tonic 
attention. In addition, this task has a better control for differences in tonic alertness when 
comparing groups of healthy and/or patient participants, since such differences may 
modulate the functioning of other attentional functions (see chapter 3, Experiment 1, for 
more details). Finally, an ulterior version of ANT has been developed by Luna and 
colleagues (In preparation). The Attention Network Test for Interactions and Vigilance - 
executive and arousal components (ANTI-Vea) measure simultaneously the functioning 
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of the typical attentional networks (phasic alertness, orienting and executive control), 
together with two different components of vigilance (executive –detection of infrequent 
signals-, and arousal –immediate reaction without response control-) (see Chapter 4, 
Experiment 1, for more details). 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Experimental procedure. (a) The four cue conditions; (b) The six stimuli used 
in the experiment; and (c) An example of the procedure (Fan et al., 2002) 
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Chapter 2 
 
Mindfulness: a new perspective of awareness 
 
 
Hic: “Present moment never comes back…yesterday was yesterday and 
today is today”  
Nunc: “I always say that we need to be mindfully present in every 
circumstance of time”  
Hic: “And place!”  
Nunc: “Of course Hic, fully awareness of every little perception of senses, 
mood states and every situation we are living needs our synergic fusion”  
Hic: “Being always constantly, perfectly present to oneself” 
 
 
2.1. Hic et nunc of awareness: origins of mindfulness 
         In the last decades, “mindfulness” has become cornerstone of a considerable 
attention by extended part of clinicians and experimental psychologists. The ontological 
concept has been described as “the intentional cultivation of a non-judgementally 
awareness that arise through paying attention, on purpose, in the present moment” (Kabat-
Zinn, 1990; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Historically, mindfulness has been called “the heart” of 
Buddhist meditation (Thera, 1962). The word mindfulness originally comes from the Pali 
word sati, which means having awareness, attention and remembering (Bodhi, 2000) and 
has been used to refer to psychological state of awareness, a practice that promotes this 
awareness, a mode of processing information and a characterological trait (Davis & 
Hayes, 2011). Mindfulness practices take a variety of forms, from a range of formal ones 
that are undertaken for varying periods of time on a regular basis, to informal ones that 
are aimed at cultivating a continuity of awareness in all activities of daily living (Kabat-
Zinn, 2003). Mindfulness in contemporary psychology has been adopted as an approach 
for increasing awareness and responding skillfully to mental processes that contribute to 
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emotional distress and maladaptive behavior (Bishop et al., 2004). It is, now, important 
to characterize the components of mindfulness that, in the last decades, were described 
by several models and constructs in order to understand why this practice could be so 
important for our well-being and health. 
 
2.2. Mindfulness: a proposed operational definition 
       Bishop et al., (2004) propose a two-component model of mindfulness: the first one 
involving self-regulation of attention towards the immediate present moment, the second 
pertaining to the adoption of an orientation marked by curiosity, openness and acceptance. 
It is important, now, to describe every single component in terms of behavioral and 
experiential features and in terms of the implicated psychological processes. 
 
2.2.1. Self-regulation of Attention 
          According to this model, mindfulness begins by bringing awareness to current 
experience—observing and attending to the changing field of thoughts, feelings, and 
sensations from moment to moment—by regulating the focus of attention. This leads to 
a feeling of being very alert to what is occurring in the here-and-now. It is often described 
as a feeling of being fully present and alive in the moment. Hence, it could increase skills 
of sustained attention. Sustained attention is the ability to direct and focus cognitive 
activity on specific stimuli. Sustained attention on the breath thus keeps attention 
anchored in current experience so that thoughts, feelings, and sensations can be detected 
as they arise in the stream of consciousness. Further, mindfulness could increase skills of 
switching. Switching is an executive function and a kind of cognitive flexibility that 
involves the ability to shift attention between one task and another. This ability allows a 
person to rapidly and efficiently adapt to different situations. Thus, one of the prediction 
of this model is that the development of mindfulness would be associated with 
improvements in sustained attention and switching, which can be objectively measured 
using standard tests. The self-regulation of attention also involves a direct experience of 
events in the mind and body (Teasdale, Segal, Williams, & Mark, 1995), that is, all 
thoughts or events are considered an object of observation, not a distraction. Mindfulness 
practices are thought to be associated with improvements in cognitive inhibition, 
particularly at the level of stimulus selection. The term cognitive inhibition refers to the 
ability to control or suppress irrelevant responses, and to adopt instead relevant and 
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flexible responses. This can be objectively measured using tasks that require the 
inhibition of semantic processing (e.g., emotional Stroop; Williams, Mathews, & 
MacLeod, 1996). Furthermore, Bishop et al. argue that rather than observing experience 
through the filter of our beliefs, assumptions, expectations, and desires, mindfulness 
involves a direct observation of various objects as if for the first time, a quality that is 
often referred to as “beginner’s mind”. The prediction is that mindfulness practice should 
facilitate the identification of objects in unexpected contexts because one would not bring 
preconceived beliefs about what should or should not be present. 
 
2.2.2. Orientation to Experience 
          Mindfulness is further defined by an orientation to experience that is adopted and 
cultivated in mindfulness meditation practices. People are instructed to make an effort to 
just take notice of each thought, feeling, and sensation that arises in the stream of 
consciousness. A stance of acceptance is taken toward each moment of one’s experience. 
Acceptance is defined as being experientially open to the reality of the present moment 
(Roemer & Orsillo, 2002). Acceptance turns out to be one of the most helpful attitudes to 
bring to mindfulness. Acceptance means perceiving your experience and simply 
acknowledging it rather than judging it as good or bad. Acceptance doesn’t mean 
resignation; it refers to your experience from moment to moment. Adopting a stance of 
curiosity and acceptance during mindfulness practices should eventually lead to 
reductions in the use of cognitive and behavioral strategies to avoid aspects of experience 
and would be expected to change the psychological context in which those objects are 
now experienced. Mindfulness can thus be further conceptualized as a process of 
investigative awareness that involves observing the ever-changing flow of private 
experience. People are instructed to avoid trying to produce a particular state (e.g., 
relaxation), but rather to just notice each object that arises in the stream of consciousness. 
Furthermore, Bishop and collaborators argue that monitoring the stream of consciousness 
in this manner over time would likely lead to increased cognitive complexity as reflected 
by an ability to generate differentiated and integrated representations of cognitive and 
affective experience. Further, mindfulness practices provide opportunities to gain insight 
into the nature of thoughts and feelings as passing events in the mind rather than as 
inherent aspects of the self or valid reflections on reality (Teasdale et al., 1995; Teasdale, 
1999a, 1999b; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). 
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2.3. Mindfulness and the three-component model  
         Shapiro et al., (2006) propose a three-component model (axioms) of mindfulness: 
intention, attention and attitude. The three axioms of mindfulness are not separate stages. 
They are interwoven aspects of a single cyclic process and occur simultaneously. 
Intention signifies the practitioner’s personal vision, which shifts along a continuum 
‘from self-regulation, to self-exploration, and finally to self-liberation’; attention means 
developing the competencies of applied and sustained focus, and flexibility of focus; and 
attitude is an accepting, open and kind curiosity towards one’s own experience. In the 
learning process, these internal behaviors are engaged to attend to the mind and body as 
it presents itself in the here and now, without habitual judgments and interpretations. 
Intention is why we practice. Attention is what we practice. Attitude is how we practice. 
This produces a shift in perspective called reperceiving, through which one gains an 
increased capacity for objectivity about one’s own internal experience. This, in turn, 
increases self-regulation and self-management, creativity, and cognitive, emotional and 
behavioral flexibility. In scientific accounts across the different discourses of meditation 
and mindfulness, the shift has also been described as a “de-automatisation of the 
psychological structures that organize, limit, select and interpret psychological stimuli” 
(Deikman, 1966); “decentering”– the capacity to view experience from “outside” (Safran 
& Segal 1990); and in traditional Buddhist meditation, the position of the “silent witness”. 
This enlargement of awareness is not the same as dissociation or disconnection, but rather 
a functional development that enables the practitioner to transform previously rigid 
cognitive and emotional styles. Shapiro et al. (2006) identified further outcomes of 
reperceiving: values clarification, which provides an opportunity to choose new and more 
congruent values; and exposure, where previously difficult thoughts and emotions can be 
encountered so as to reduce their capacity for disruption. 
 
2.4. Mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) 
       Mindfulness-based interventions, therapeutic approaches grounded in mindfulness, 
promote the practice as an important part of good physical and mental health. In the 
Western world, mindfulness-based interventions are becoming widely accepted methods 
of addressing the symptoms associated with many commonly experienced mental health 
challenges and/or emotional concerns. Currently, there are four recognized therapy 
models that incorporate mindfulness practices: Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction 
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(MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990), Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, 
Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan Marsha, 
1987) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT, Hayes, Wilson, and Strosahl, 
1999). Though these approaches all involve mindfulness techniques, there are slight 
differences between each modality. MBSR and MBCT actively teach mindfulness 
meditation, but MBCT also integrates cognitive behavioral therapy techniques as a part 
of treatment. DBT and ACT do not teach mindfulness mediation but instead utilize other 
mindfulness exercises to promote awareness and focus attention. Additionally, while 
MBSR and MBCT focus on the process of developing mindfulness as well as any 
associated thoughts, DBT and ACT focus primarily on the cognitions experienced during 
the state of mindfulness. MBSR program is designed as an 8-week course with one 
weekly meeting for 2.5 hours to develop mindfulness skills and talk about stress and 
coping. “Formal” home assignments (45 min/day) following CDs with guided meditation 
practices—as well as “informal” (15 min/day) assignments to be carried out during other, 
daily activities are given every week to support training outside the courses. An intensive 
retreat (7 hours) is held during the sixth week. The three most central exercises in MBSR 
are the body scan, the sitting meditation, and hatha yoga postures. During the body scan, 
participants are lying down with eyes closed, carefully observing areas of the body, just 
noticing how they feel moment by moment with a non-judgmental attitude. Instructions 
are open and generally without suggestions (e.g., “Notice how your legs are in this 
moment—whether they are heavy or light. Just notice how they are, and let it be okay”). 
Likewise, breathe exercises and hatha yoga train mindfulness in part through continued, 
non-judgmental noticing of bodily sensations. In sitting meditation, participants are 
encouraged to observe and be curious about their thoughts as they wander but crucially 
not to judge them as “good” or “bad.” Thus, an essential goal is a renewed relation to the 
total life experience, incorporating a non-judgmental attitude toward all things, beings, 
thoughts, and emotions. Awareness of the transiency of all things is aimed for to improve 
the central ability to “let go” of, for example, painful thoughts and emotions. This 
presumably reduces tendencies to ruminate and eases the non-judgmental returning of 
awareness to the present moment. MBCT program is conducted over a period of six 
weeks, and consisted of seven 2 hour group sessions, and an additional half day retreat at 
the end of the fifth week. During each session the instructor guide the participants through 
different meditations including breathing meditation, body scan, open awareness 
meditation, walking meditation and compassion meditation. Each session additionally 
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included different awareness exercises, stories and group discussions to allow a broader 
understanding of mindfulness principles, and provide the participants with opportunities 
to share their meditation experiences. Daily home practice of formal meditation of at least 
20 minutes is required, as well as informal daily mindfulness practice in which 
participants attend to regular daily activities in a mindful manner. Audio CD’s with 
meditation instructions are provided to facilitate home practice. Additionally, participants 
received a daily email notification directing them to an online diary for filling a report of 
their daily home practice. During the half day retreat participants practice different formal 
meditations in silence, with no exercises or group discussions. DBT is a cognitive 
behavioral and mindfulness-based therapy for borderline personality disorder (BPD). The 
main dialectic is between the opposing forces of change and acceptance, i.e. accepting 
the ways things are while simultaneously working to improve them. Mindfulness is taught 
as a set of skills through structured exercises. These include observing, describing and 
participating in one’s present moment experience in a non-judgmental, one-thing-at-a-
time and effective manner. DBT teaches how to make use of the ‘wise mind’ – the 
inherent ability to be clearly aware of thoughts and feelings. Finally, ACT is an 
empirically based psychological intervention that uses acceptance and mindfulness 
strategies, together with commitment and behavior change strategies, to increase 
psychological flexibility. Psychological flexibility means fully connecting with the 
present moment as a conscious human being and, based on what the situation affords, 
changing or persisting in behavior depending on the individual’s chosen values. Although 
it draws strongly on a cognitive behavioral framework, ACT differs in its predominant 
use of mindfulness exercises in individual therapy to assist people towards flexibility. 
 
2.5. Mindfulness questionnaires, scales and assessments for measuring 
       Mindfulness can be considered both a state and a trait (Medvedev, Krägeloh, 
Narayanan, & Siegert, 2017). A state refers to a momentary emotional reaction to internal 
and/or external trigger(s) which also involves physical, behavioral, cognitive and 
psychological reactions. The duration and intensity of the emotion felt can vary due to 
various factors such as the level of arousal, frustration level, subjective perception, the 
context and etc. Once the emotional reaction passes, equilibrium resumes (Spielberger & 
Sydeman, 1994). States, hence, create a temporary emotional change. Emotional states 
presumably fluctuate over time. A trait, on the other hand, implies a more permanent 
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presence and a stable level of emotion. Traits refer to the stable, consistent and enduring 
disposition of the individual (Allport & Odbert, 1936), which includes emotional 
reactions and temperament, rather than situational, variable and temporary factors 
(Hamaker, Nesselroade, & Molenaar, 2007). Traits present the tendency of an individual 
to constantly feel, think and behave in a certain way (Spielberger & Sydeman, 1994). One 
can speak of a trait when the same emotional states chronically appear in a stable frequent 
manner and it is generalized in many different situations and contexts (Forgays, Forgays, 
& Spielberger, 1997). We often use traits to describe individual’s personality 
characteristics that are stable of time. The traits interact with different factors to create 
many emotional states. This is done by the manner in which the factors such as situations, 
stimuli and interactions are being perceived, processed and the psychological, behavioral 
and emotional outcome of these processes (Kantor, Endler, Heslegrave, Kocovski, 2001). 
The states/traits interactions cause the attention and information processing and the 
interpretational level to become very limited and biased (Block, 2005). Regarding 
mindfulness, state mindfulness refers to a temporary condition in which an individual is 
aware of their thoughts and feelings and able to stay present when distractions arise while 
trait mindfulness is the more permanent ability to enter a mindful perspective at will, in 
which an individual recognizes what they are thinking and feeling, accepts them without 
judgment, and keeps the focus on being present. The most popular scale for measuring 
mindfulness is the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS), developed by Brown and 
Ryan (2003). The trait MAAS is a 15-item scale designed to assess a core characteristic 
of mindfulness, namely, a receptive state of mind in which attention, informed by a 
sensitive awareness of what is occurring in the present, simply observes what is taking 
place. The MAAS measures an individual’s tendency to enter a state of mindfulness 
through the individual’s frequency of having certain experiences related to mindfulness 
and mindlessness. The Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale (CAMS) was first 
developed in 2005 by Kumar, Feldman, and Hayes. It was subsequently reviewed and 
revised in 2007 by Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson, and Laurenceau into the Cognitive 
and Affective Scale of Mindfulness-Revised (CAMS-R). The Cognitive and Affective 
Mindfulness Scale (CAMS) is an 18-item scale designed to capture a broad 
conceptualization of mindfulness, with language that is not specific to any particular type 
of meditation training. The Cognitive Affective Mindfulness Scale Revised (CAMS-R) 
is a 12 item, unidimensional scale that assesses the four domains of mindfulness 
(attention, present-focus, awareness, acceptance/non-judgment). The consensus on the 
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revised CAMS is that it effectively captures a multi-component measurement of 
mindfulness and can be relied upon to relate with other measures as expected. The 
Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI; Buchheld, Grossman, Walach, 2001) is a 30-item 
scale that is designed to measure the concept of mindfulness, measured as either an 
outcome of an intervention, as a moderating variable or personality trait. A 14-item short 
form version has also been developed, which is more suitable for use in generalized 
context where a Buddhist background of mindfulness is limited and measures 
mindfulness as a unidimensional construct (or one component on its own, without 
multiple subcomponents or facets). The Langer Mindfulness Scale (LMS; Pirson, Langer, 
Bodner, and Zilcha-Mano, 2012) is a 21 or 14-item scale that assesses mindfulness in four 
categories that include novelty producing, flexibility, novelty seeking, and engagement. 
These domains “describe a person’s relative openness to experience, willingness to 
challenge strict categories, and continual reassessment of the environment and their 
reactions to it” (Langer, 2004). These researchers noticed that many mindfulness 
measures suffered from a lack of clarity or empirical support, and set out to create a more 
precise and structured assessment to capture a measure of mindfulness that incorporated 
a socio-cognitive perspective. The Solloway Mindfulness Survey (SMS) was created in 
2007 by Solloway and Fisher, for the purpose of tracking the progress of mindfulness 
students as they learn about mindfulness and begin to engage in the practice. The SMS 
consists of 30 items that measures mindfulness from the perspective of mindfulness as a 
skill set or capacity to practice, a semi-state in that it is changeable, but more trait-like in 
that it is relatively stable unless knowledge and practice is actively pursued. Another 
mindfulness scale that comes from a skill-based perspective is the Kentucky Inventory of 
Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004). This scale was developed to 
measure four mindfulness related skills, as well as an overall tendency to be mindful 
during daily life. The KIMS consists of 39 items related to what one does while practicing 
mindfulness, and how one does it. The “what” skills include observing (noticing or 
attending to) current experience, describing (noting or labeling observed experiences) 
with words, and participating (focusing full attention on current activity); the “how” skills 
include being nonjudgmental (accepting, refraining from evaluation), being one-mindful 
(using undivided attention), and being effective (using skillful means) (Baer et al., 2009).  
The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS; Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, and 
Farrow, 2008) is a 20-item measure consisting of 2 sub-scales (acceptance and present 
moment awareness). Some research has suggested that these two components are strong 
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and independent factors of mindfulness, and thus should be considered two components 
for the purpose of measuring mindfulness. The Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau et 
al., 2006) is a 13-item, two-factor structure (Curiosity, Decentering), uniquely state-
oriented for use immediately following a meditation experience and has been validated 
in a number of clinical contexts. The items of Factor 1 (Curiosity) reflect an attitude of 
wanting to learn more about one’s experiences. The items of Factor 2 (Decentering) 
reflect a shift from identifying personally with thoughts and feelings to relating to one’s 
experience in a wider field of awareness. The Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire 
(SMQ; first introduced as Mindfulness Questionnaire, MQ, Chadwick et al. 2005, in Baer 
et al. 2006) is a 16-item scale with four related bipolar aspects of a mindful approach to 
distressing thoughts and images. Hence, the SMQ may prove to be very useful for the 
investigation of relationships between mental health problems and mindful awareness. 
The scale appears particularly suited for studies focusing on the effects of a mindful 
attitude towards distressing inner experiences but may be too specific for more general 
use, as it does not involve items relating to positive or neutral phenomena. Yet, the current 
situation in the self-report assessment of mindfulness suffers from several limitations. 
First, each of the validated mindfulness scales is associated with particular advantages 
but also disadvantages for a comprehensive assessment of mindfulness in the general 
population. Second, substantial differences in the covered aspects of mindfulness hinder 
the comparison of results from studies using different scales, thus impeding 
communication about the construct (Brown et al., 2007; Malinowski, 2008). Finally, 
results from current scales point at a possible further problem: the inclusion of items that 
can be easily misinterpreted, in particular by respondents who are not familiar with the 
mindfulness concept (cf. Grossman, 2008). The following questionnaire was the 
assessment used in the present work and one of the most popular measure of mindfulness 
in different contexts. 
 
2.5.1. The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire  
          The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) is a 39-item 
self-report measure of mindfulness skills that is becoming widely used in psychological 
research generally and in process-outcome work on MBCT and MBSR specifically. This 
scale and its facets resulted from an exploratory factor analysis of the combined pool of 
112 items collected from the KIMS, the FMI, the MAAS, the CAMS, and the SMQ. 
Although the items of the FFMQ were compiled from five separate mindfulness 
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measures, 24 of its 39 items are from the KIMS and four of the five facets correspond to 
the four facets that comprise the KIMS. The factor analysis produced five factors that 
could be replicated with confirmatory factor analysis (Baer et al., 2006). The five facets 
the authors refer to can be described as follows: 
 Observing facet measures the tendency to notice or attend to internal and external 
experiences, such as sensations, emotions, cognitions, sounds, sights, and smells 
(items such as “I remain present with sensations and feelings even when they are 
unpleasant or painful”). 
 Describing measures the tendency to describe and label these experiences with 
words (items such as “I'm good at finding the words to describe my feelings”). 
 Acting with awareness facet refers to bringing full awareness and undivided 
attention to current activity or experiences (items such as “I find it difficult to stay 
focused on what's happening in the present”). 
 Nonjudging refers to a nonevaluative stance toward inner experiences (items such 
as “I tend to evaluate whether my perceptions are right or wrong”). 
 Nonreactivity measures the tendency to allow thoughts and feelings to come and 
go, without getting caught up in them or carried away by them (items such as 
“Usually when I have distressing thoughts or images, I step back and am aware of 
the thought or image without getting taken over by it”). 
Items were scored on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never or very rarely true) 
to 5 (very often or always true). Facet scores were computed by summing the scores on 
the individual items. Facet scores range from 8 to 40 (except for the nonreactivity facet 
which ranges from 7 to 35), with higher scores indicating more mindfulness. Preliminary 
psychometric analyses show that the FFMQ has adequate reliability, convergent and 
discriminant validity, and incremental validity in the prediction of psychological 
symptoms (Baer et al., 2006). The five facet scales demonstrated adequate to good 
internal consistency, with alpha coefficients ranging from .75 to .91, and relationships 
between the facet scales and other variables were consistent with predictions in most 
cases. 
 
2.6. Neuroscience of mindfulness 
       Given the increasing popularity of mindfulness meditation, and mounting evidence 
that meditation has wide-ranging and measurable effects on many aspects of health, 
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neuroscientists too are becoming interested in understanding the biological mechanisms 
that underlie these effects in the brain. Farb et al., (2007) broke new ground in our 
understanding of mindfulness from a neuroscience perspective. They argued that people 
interact with the world using two different set of networks: one network for experiencing 
your experience involves what is called the "default network", which includes regions of 
the medial prefrontal cortex, along with memory regions such as the hippocampus; one 
network of direct experience that includes the insula, a region that relates to perceiving 
bodily sensations and the anterior cingulate cortex which is a region central to switching 
your attention. The default network is involved in planning, daydreaming and ruminating. 
When the default network is active you take in information from the outside world, 
process it through a filter of what everything means, add your interpretations and doesn't 
take much effort to operate. On the contrary, when the direct experience network is active 
you are experiencing information coming into your senses in real time. A series of other 
studies has found that these two circuits, ‘narrative’ and direct experience, are inversely 
correlated. You can experience the world through your narrative circuitry, which will be 
useful for planning, goal setting, and strategizing. You can also experience the world 
more directly, which enables more sensory information to be perceived. Experiencing the 
world through the direct experience network allows you to get closer to the reality of any 
event. You perceive more information about events occurring around you, as well as more 
accurate information about these events. Noticing more real-time information makes you 
more flexible in how you respond to the world. You also become less imprisoned by the 
past, your habits, expectations or assumptions, and more able to respond to events as they 
unfold. Tang et al., (2015) wrote an extensive review that took look at the current state of 
neuroscience research on mindfulness meditation. The authors wrote: “Although 
meditation research is still in its infancy, a number of studies have investigated changes 
in brain activation at rest and during specific tasks that are associated with the practice 
of, or that follow, training in mindfulness meditation. There is emerging evidence that 
mindfulness meditation might cause neuroplastic changes in the structure and function of 
brain regions involved in regulation of attention, emotion and self-awareness”. Numerous 
neuroimaging studies have investigated changes in brain morphology related to 
mindfulness meditation. The study of Tang et al. found that eight brain regions were 
consistently altered in the experienced meditators: anterior cingulate cortex and mid-
cingulate cortex, cortical regions involved in self-regulation, emotional regulation, 
attention, and self-control; hippocampus, subcortical structures involved in memory 
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formation and facilitating emotional responses; rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, a region 
associated with meta-awareness (awareness of how you think), introspection, and 
processing of complex, abstract information; sensory cortices and insular cortex, the 
main cortical hubs for processing of tactile information such touch, pain, conscious 
proprioception, and body awareness and superior longitudinal fasciculus and corpus 
callosum, subcortical white matter tracts that communicate within and between brain 
hemispheres. Data were from studies that used different neuroimaging measurements but 
changes were seen in  grey matter density of brain tissue (Vestergaard-Poulsen et al., 
2009; Hölzel et al., 2011), thickness of brain tissue (indicating greater number of neurons, 
glia, or fibers in a given region) (Lazar et al., 2005; Farb et al., 2013), cortical surface 
area, and white matter fiber density. Tang et al., suggested in their review that the effects 
of meditation might involve large-scale brain networks and multiple aspects of brain 
function. Brain imaging studies not only reveal difference in brain structure but also 
changes in brain activation patterns. In their review, Tang et al. also investigated whether 
mindfulness meditation exerts its effects via altered activation of brain regions involved 
with attention, emotional regulation and self-awareness. Several functional and structural 
MRI studies on mindfulness training have investigated neuroplasticity in brain regions 
supporting attention regulation. The brain region to which the effects of mindfulness 
training on attention is most consistently linked is the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). 
The ACC enables executive attention and control by detecting the presence of conflicts 
emerging from incompatible streams of information processing. Other attention-related 
brain regions in which functional changes have been observed following mindfulness 
meditation include the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), where responses were 
enhanced during executive processing, and parietal attention regions, which showed 
greater activation following an MBSR course in people with social anxiety. One 
hypothesis driving emotion regulation is that mindfulness meditation strengthens 
prefrontal higher order cognitive (thinking) processes that in turn modulate activity in 
brain regions relevant to emotion processing, such as the amygdala. A number of brain-
imaging studies appeared to support this hypothesis. Studies of mindfulness meditators 
have shown training to be associated with more positive self-representation, higher self-
esteem, and higher acceptance of oneself. Such concepts are not easy to capture in 
neuroscientific studies. However, multiple studies show the insular is strongly activated 
during meditation. This is thought to represent amplified awareness of the present 
moment experience (Figure 1). Despite the enthusiastic reporting of positive findings on 
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the effects of meditation on the brain, it should be pointed out that mindfulness meditation 
research is a young field, and many studies are yet to be replicated. They concluded: ‘if 
supported by rigorous research studies, the practice of mindfulness meditation might be 
promising for the treatment of clinical disorders and might facilitate the cultivation of a 
healthy mind and increased well-being’. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Brain regions involved in the components of mindfulness meditation (Tang et 
al., 2015) 
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Chapter 3 
 
Experiment 1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
    As mindfulness has been described as “a particular way to pay attention” (Kabat-Zinn, 
1990, 2003), its effects could be modify our attentional processing. More specifically, 
recent conceptualizations have suggested mindfulness meditation to improve self-
regulation of attention (Bishop et al., 2004; Shapiro et al., 2006). Mindfulness aims to 
achieve a relaxed, non-judgmental awareness of your thoughts, feelings and sensations: 
“a direct knowing of what is going on inside and outside ourselves, moment by moment” 
(Williams et al., 2002). Buddhist monks have been practicing a similar technique for 
2,500 years, but western medicine caught on in the late 1970s when a US medical 
professor, Jon Kabat-Zinn, began successfully treating patients with chronic pain using a 
secular program he called Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (see Chapter 2 for more 
details). It has been found to be effective in the management of stress, physical illnesses 
and psychological difficulties with a range of clinical and non-clinical populations 
(Grossman et al., 2004). So far, few studies investigated the effect of MBSR training on 
attentional performance. In a pioneer study, Jha, Krompinger, and Baime (2007) 
examined the effects of mindfulness practice on the three attention networks (alerting, 
orienting, and conflict monitoring) using the Attention Network Test (ANT; Fan, 
McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum, & Posner, 2005). Attentional efficiency was assessed 
before and after an eight-week MBSR course administered to meditation-naïve 
participants, a one-month intensive mindfulness retreat attended by experienced 
meditators, and an eight-week no treatment control group. Results of the study indicate 
that the retreat group showed better conflict monitoring at baseline than participants in 
the control and MBSR groups, suggesting that executive attention improves with long-
term exposure to mindfulness meditation. An interesting finding was that orienting scores 
improved in the MBSR group to levels that were higher than those displayed by either 
the control or retreat participants. This is surprising because one would expect orienting 
scores to increase in both meditation groups. Finally, the retreat group displayed improved 
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alerting compared to control and MBSR groups. The authors concluded that mindfulness 
training may enhance the functioning of each of the attentional subsystems at various 
points in the course of mindfulness training. van den Hurk et al., (2010) used the attention 
network test and tested a group of more experienced meditators than those tested in the 
study by Jha et al. (mean 14.5 years, range 0.33–35 years in our group vs. mean 5 years, 
range 0.33–30 years in the study by Jha et al.). With this sample of more experienced 
meditators, they expected to increase the likelihood of finding differences within the 
orienting and executive network. They found that meditators showed a significant better 
orienting of attention and a trend towards a significantly better executive attention and 
that meditators showed a significantly higher degree of attentional processing efficiency 
than controls. Tang et al. (2007) also reported noteworthy findings from a study of  
undergraduate Chinese students randomly assigned to 5 days of 20-minute meditation 
practice with the integrative body–mind training (IBMT) or a control group given training 
in Progressive Muscle Relaxation (PMR) on the ANT. IBMT comes from traditional 
Chinese medicine and incorporates aspects of other meditation training, such as body 
relaxation, breathing adjustment, and mental imagery in addition to mindfulness training. 
Compared with the control group, the experimental group showed greater improvement 
in conflict scores on the ANT. While this study provides valuable data about the impact 
of relatively brief meditation training on attentional performance compared to a relaxation 
control group, the intervention was not strict mindfulness training, as noted above. 
Mindfulness training is a feasible intervention and may improve behavioral and 
neurocognitive impairments (Zylowska et al., 2008). The main goal of this study is to 
investigate attention improvements of MBSR training compared to a Control group       
using the Attention Network Test for Interaction-Vigilance (ANTI-V; Roca et al., 2011), 
to better understand awareness strategies used by our attentional system. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
       Forty-four participants took part in this study (range 22-61 years old with a mean of 
38.44) recruited from those who were interested in learning meditation and who had no 
prior meditation experience. Participants were assigned to a MBSR intervention group 
(21 participants) and to a waiting list group (23 participants) both matched in age and 
gender. All participants had a normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
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2.2. Interventions 
2.2.1 MBSR (Mindfulness-based stress reduction protocol) 
         MBSR is an 8 week intervention protocol (see Chapter 2 for more details) that 
consists of multiple forms of mindfulness practice, including formal and informal 
meditation practice, as well as hatha yoga (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). The formal practice 
consists of breath-focused attention, body scan-based attention to the transient nature of 
sensory experience, shifting attention across sensory modalities, open monitoring of 
moment-to-moment experience, walking meditation, and eating meditation. Informal 
practice entails brief pauses involving volitionally shifting attention to present moment 
awareness. Together, this package of mindfulness practices aims to enhance the ability to 
observe the immediate content of experience, specifically, the transient nature of 
thoughts, emotion and physical sensation. MBSR training was conducted by a teacher 
with experience in teaching mindfulness meditation. 
            
2.3. Materials and procedure 
      All participants were tested individually in a quiet room after signing a consent form 
and completing the Italian version of Five Facets of Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, 
Baer et al., 2006; Giovannini et al., 2014).  
 
2.3.1. Attention Network Test for Interactions-Vigilance (ANTI-V) 
          We used a modified version of ANTI-V (Roca et al., 2011; Bukowski et al., 2015; 
Morales et al., 2015). The only change with respect to the original task is that the latter 
used arrows as stimuli instead of cars (Figure 1). Participants were presented with a black 
fixation cross for a range of 400-1600 ms, that varied randomly, followed by a row of 
five arrows (above or below the fixation cross) pointing either left or right (200 ms), 
containing the central target arrow. The task was to indicate the direction of the central 
arrow, independently of the direction of flankers, by pressing “c” for left or “m” for right 
and the participants’ responses were allowed up to 2000 ms. In order to analyze the 
functioning of executive control network, half of the times flanker arrows pointed at the 
same direction of central target arrow (congruent condition), whereas they pointed in the 
opposite direction (incongruent condition) in the other half of trials. Before presentation 
of the stimuli (100 ms) an asterisk was presented (50 ms) either in the same location of 
target (valid cue condition), in the opposite location of target (invalid cue condition) or 
no asterisk presentation (no cue condition). Also, half of trials presented a warning tone 
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(50 ms) after stimulus (warning tone condition) and half of trials did not present a warning 
tone (no warning tone condition). Finally, in order to analyze the functioning of vigilance, 
a 25% of trials presented a significantly displaced central target arrow and participants 
had to detect these infrequent stimuli by pressing a spacebar. The task was composed of 
7 blocks of 64 trials each (48 trials for ANTI, 16 for vigilance). The first block was a 
practice block and participants received feedback of their accuracy. The last 6 blocks were 
experimental blocks and no accuracy feedback was given. The task had a duration of 
about 40 min. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Attentional Network Task for Interaction-Vigilance. Schematic representation 
of the procedure (Bukowski et al., 2015) 
 
 
 
2.4. Data analysis and results 
       First, analyses were run in 2 steps: ANTI analysis and Vigilance analysis. In order to 
analyze the attentional effects of ANTI task, RT and Accuracy (Errors %) data were 
submitted to ANOVAs with Warning signal (No Tone and Tone), Visual Cue (Invalid, 
No-cue and Valid) and Congruency conditions (Incongruent and congruent) as repeated-
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measures factor. Attention network scores were computed as subtraction of specific 
conditions (phasic alertness score: No Tone – Tone, only in No-cue condition; orienting 
score: Invalid – Valid and executive control score: Incongruent – Congruent). Further, to 
evaluate performance in the Executive Vigilance (EV) task the Signal Detection Theory 
(SDT) indexes were calculated: Hits as a proportion of correct responses to infrequent 
stimuli; False Alarms (FA) as a proportion of incorrect responses to frequent targets; 
sensitivity (d’) and response bias (β, Beta). Then, we carried out an ANOVA, on the pre-
treatment session (PRE), with Group as a between participants variable, and Warning 
Signal, Visual Cue and Congruency as within participants variables, to see whether the 
task worked properly and there were no group differences. Here, we observed main 
effects of the three ANTI variables. For RT results, Warning Signal [ F(1, 43) = 13,801, 
p < .001], Visual Cue [ F(2, 86) = 42,417 , p < .001] and Congruency [ F(1, 43) = 157,45, 
p < .001]. For Accuracy (Errors %) results, Warning Signal [ F(1, 43) = ,25840, p > .05], 
Visual Cue [ F(2, 86) = ,71185 , p > .05] and Congruency [ F(1, 43) = 50,593, p < .001] 
(Figure 2). However, none of this effects was modulated by Group, neither was a main 
effect of Group [ F(1, 42) = ,10635, p > .05].  Therefore, the task seemed to work properly 
and the groups were similar. For EV results, a significant main effect of blocks was 
observed for Hits [ F(5, 215) = 3,3451, p < .005] but no for FAs [ F(5, 215) = ,74436, p 
> .05]. Figure 3 shows that Hits tend to increase with time on task. No significant main 
effect of blocks was found for Response Bias (β) [ F(5, 215) = 1,1814, p > .05] and a 
significant trend was found for Sensitivity (d’) [ F(5, 215) = 2,0504, p = .07] (Figure 4). 
Further, repeated measures ANOVA for Session (PRE-POST) x Group x Warning Signal, 
Session (PRE-POST) x Group x Visual Cue and Session (PRE-POST) x Group x 
Congruency were not significant. No significant differences found in Executive Vigilance 
indexes neither. Then, an analysis was performed for each FFMQ factor to see whether 
training was effective. Session and Group were introduced in a mixed ANOVA for each 
factor. Only the Observe measure showed a significant interaction, indicating that the 
MBSR group increased the Observe score in the post-treatment session more than the 
control group. That is, increased Observe score was significant only for MBSR group 
(effect of training), [ F(1, 42) = 10,79202, p < .005] (Figure 5). No change in the Control 
group, F(1, 42) = ,012131, p = .91. Further, a Bayes factor analysis on the same data 
showed that the Bayes factor for the interaction term is 7.474. A Bayes factor of this size 
indicates strong evidence of this effect (Figure 6). 
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Figure 2. RT mean and Accuracy (%) of the three attentional networks 
 
 
Figure 3. Executive Vigilance performance per blocks in ANTI-V task: Hits and FA 
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Figure 4. Executive Vigilance performance per blocks in ANTI-V task: d’ and Beta 
 
Figure 5. Significant increased Observe score in posttreatment session only for MBSR 
group (effect of training) 
 
 
Model Comparison - S2_Observe 
Models P(M) P(M|data) BF M BF 10 % error 
Null model  0.500  0.118  0.134  1.000    
S1_Group  0.500  0.882  7.474  7.474  7.391e -4  
Figure 6. Bayesian analysis (JASP) of the Observe score difference (marked number) in 
posttreatment session: MBSR and Control group 
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3. Discussion 
     The main goal of this study was to investigate whether a mindfulness training could 
affect attentional performance. More specifically, whether MBSR training could have its 
effects on attentional networks (Alerting, Orienting and Executive Control) and vigilance 
performance. In the present study, Attention Network Test for Interactions-Vigilance 
(ANTI-V) was used to investigate these effects. A further variation of the ANTI in which 
a measure of vigilance is added. This measure evaluates tonic alertness (i.e., the ability to 
detect infrequent, unpredictable and unexpected stimuli) and it is obtained in addition to 
the usual phasic alertness, orienting and executive control scores. This new task provided 
a direct measure of vigilance. Participants receiving MBSR experience performed ANTI-
V task before and after training. At the same time, their performance was contrasted with 
the performance of control participants who were tested also in two sessions. Data 
analysis revealed no significant differences in MBSR group respect to Control group in 
all the measured attentional indexes: ANTI and EV measurements. However, the effect 
of training was effective. Participants in the MBSR group show an increased Observe 
score in the posttreatment session (effect of training). No significant differences in the 
Control group. MBSR is aimed to increase awareness of the present moment. The 
treatment plan is a new and personal way to deal with stress to the individual. External 
stressors are part of life and cannot be changed, but coping skills and how to respond to 
the stress can be changed (Bakhshani et al., 2010). In addition, few studies report effects 
of MBSR training in improving cognitive functions as attentional performance. Many 
future studies are needed to develop a better understanding of the relationship between 
MBSR training and attention. Future studies should include an active-control group, 
neuroimaging measurements together with behavioral measures and more elaborated 
characterization and control over training protocols (Jha et al., 2007). Although finding 
significant increases in a measure attention, MBSR training may not have been sufficient 
to demonstrate lasting effects of mindfulness on components of attention. Further, studies 
reported improvements of cognitive functions mostly when the experimental group was 
formed by expert meditators. Affective, cognitive, physiological, and behavioral changes 
resulting from long-term mindfulness practices are likely to differ from short-term effects 
(Semple et al., 2010). Finally, evaluating the effects of mindfulness meditation practices 
over time would enlarge our understanding of meditation as attention training. Comparing 
 43 
 
selected indexes of attention in mindfulness expert meditators with varying levels of 
experience might also expand our understanding of this relationship. 
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Experiment 2 
 
1. Introduction 
     Mindfulness could be described as “an intentional cultivation of a non-judmental 
moment-to-moment awareness” (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Moreover, it is characterize by auto-
regulation of attention and the adoption of a particular orientation to present moment 
experience (Bishop et al., 2002). Further, mindfulness meditation involves a broader 
observation of one’s present moment experience, that is, physical sensations, thoughts 
and feelings (Baer, 2003). Recent enthusiasm for mindfulness in psychology has resulted 
in proliferation of self-report inventories that purport to measure mindful awareness as a 
trait (Grossman et al., 2011). These measures are a useful way to examine the mediational 
mechanisms and outcomes of mindfulness-based therapies (Brown et al., 2011), even if 
there is some criticism from experts in the field regarding their use (Grossman, 2011). 
One of the most popular mindfulness questionnaire is the Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) (see Chapter 2 for more details). Over the last 
decade, the psychometric properties of the FFMQ have been extensively examined in 
populations from different countries (Bohlmeijer et al., 2011; Deng et al., 2011; Heeren 
et al., 2011; Lilja et al., 2011; Cebolla et al., 2012; Sugiura et al., 2012; Dundas et al., 
2013; Giovannini et al., 2014). A few studies investigated the relationship between FFMQ 
and attentional skills. Di Francesco et al., (2016) found some interesting correlations 
between the two facets of FFMQ (Observe and Acting with awareness) and the attentional 
performance using ANTI task. Further, they found that regression analysis revealed that 
the mindfulness facets Observe and Acting with awareness were effective predictors of 
the efficiency of the three assessed attentional networks. More specifically, they found 
that that Observe scores predicted higher Alerting scores. Instead, Acting with awareness 
was a predictor of Orienting network. Moreover, they found no significant interactions 
between the two facets and Executive Control network. As suggested by Di Francesco et 
al., (2016), the aim of this study is to assess the relationship between mindfulness facets 
of FFMQ and the Attention Network Test for Interactions-Vigilance (ANTI-V; Roca et 
al. 2011), that includes a direct measure of executive vigilance (see Chapter 3, Experiment 
1, for more details). The new measure included may change the interactions between the 
two mindfulness facets and the attentional performance as participants have to pay 
attention to both the main task (responding accordingly to the central arrow direction) and 
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to the vigilance task (reporting trials in which the central arrow is moved slightly on the 
left or on the right). 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
       Seventy-six participants took part in this study (range 19-35 years old with a mean 
of 24.97) from Sapienza University of Rome for extra class credit. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and reported no clinical history of psychological or 
neurological problems. 
 
2.2. Assessment 
       The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) is a self-report 
measure assessing a general tendency to be mindful. This scale is composed of 39 items 
that are divided into five subscales or facets: observing, describing, acting with 
awareness, non-judging, and non-reactivity of experience. The Observing facet measures 
the tendency to notice or attend to internal and external experiences, such as sensations, 
emotions, cognitions, sounds, sights, and smells. Example items are “I remain present 
with sensations and feelings even when they are unpleasant or painful” and “I pay 
attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars passing.” Describing 
measures the tendency to describe and label these experiences with words. Items include 
“I’m good at finding the words to describe my feelings” and “My natural tendency is to 
put my experiences into words.” The Acting with awareness facet refers to bringing full 
awareness and undivided attention to current activity or experiences. Example items are 
“I rush through activities without being really attentive to them” and “I find it difficult to 
stay focused on what’s happening in the present.” Non-judging refers to a non-evaluative 
stance toward inner experiences. Items include “I tend to evaluate whether my perceptions 
are right or wrong” and “I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I 
shouldn’t feel them.” Non-reactivity measures the tendency to allow thoughts and feelings 
to come and go, without getting caught up in them or carried away by them. Items include 
“Usually when I have distressing thoughts or images, I step back and am aware of the 
thought or image without getting taken over by it.” The subscales include eight items, 
except the non-reactivity scale, which is composed of seven items. Each subscale is a 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (never or very rarely true) to 5 (very often or always true). 
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2.3. Materials and procedure 
        Materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1. 
 
2.4. Data analysis and results 
        First, in our results we replicated all the main previous findings with the ANTI-V 
task (Roca et al., 2011). These main effects of attentional indexes are not reported here, 
as they fall beyond the aim of the present study. Then, we computed the correlations 
between two mindfulness facets considered on attentional networks, Observe and Acting 
with awareness and the ANTI-V scores: both RT and Accuracy scores and Executive 
Vigilance performance indexes. Additionally, we conducted a series of multiple 
regression analyses, with the ANTI-V scores as dependent variables and the FFMQ facets 
scores as predictors like suggested by Di Francesco et al., (2016). For Observe, the first 
analysis revealed no significant correlations with the ANTI-V scores while for Acting 
with awareness we found a significant negative correlation only with Orienting Accuracy, 
r = -0.26, p < .05. All other correlation analyses of ANTI scores were not significant 
(Table 1). Correlation analyses between vigilance performance indexes with FFMQ 
facets were not significant and not reported in Table 1. As reported in Table 2, we found 
a corresponding pattern of results for the regression analyses. The regression revealed 
that Observe significantly predicted the dependent variable Orienting Accuracy, β = -.33, 
p < .05. Moreover, Acting with awareness is also a predictor of Orienting Accuracy, β = 
.30, p < .05. All other regression analyses were not significant and not reported in Table 
2.  
 
 
Table 1. Correlation results 
**p < .05 
 
Alerting RT Orienting RT Executive Control RT 
Observe -0.08 0.01 -0.04 
Acting with awareness -0.02 -0.09 -0.17 
 Alerting Accuracy Orienting Accuracy Executive Control Accuracy 
Observe 0.16 -0.19 -0.12 
Acting with awareness -0.10 -0.26** -0.12 
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Table 2. Multiple regression results 
**p < .05 
 
3. Discussion 
     The aim of this study was to investigate whether and how self-reported dispositional 
mindfulness facets are predictive of attentional network performance in a population 
naïve to meditation. To this end, we used the FFMQ questionnaire (Baer et al. 2006) to 
assess mindfulness facets and the ANTI-V test (Roca et al., 2011) to assess the efficiency 
of attentional networks and vigilance performance. Observe facet interaction with 
Alerting score found in Di Francesco et al., (2016) was not found using ANTI-V task. 
Observe facet measures the tendency to notice or attend to internal and external 
experiences, such as sensations, emotions, cognitions, sounds, sights, and smells. The 
ANTI-V task, because of its difficulty (i.e., executive vigilance trials together with 
attentional networks trials), may involve a more deeply attentional performance. As a 
consequence, external stimuli (i.e., warning signal) did not affect participants’ Observe 
facet. Furthermore, we found that Acting with awareness facet was a negative predictor 
of Orienting Network as found in Di Francesco et al., (2016). Acting with awareness facet 
refers to bringing full awareness and undivided attention to current activity or 
experiences. Participants were focused on the central location avoiding the tendency to 
proceed in “automatic pilot” (Baer et al. 2004). This evidence suggests that individuals 
with higher Acting with awareness scores tend to be slower in reacting and less accurate 
when a stimulus is presented because of their involvement in the task. More generally, 
the two considered FFMQ facets seem to affect in a different way the performance of 
ANTI respect to that of ANTI-V. This difference could be seen in terms of a changed 
mind-set of a task respect to the other one. Further studies could better understand whether 
and how a different task (i.e., ANTI-Vea task), including two different measures of 
vigilance performance (executive and arousal components) together with the measure of 
the typical attentional networks (phasic alertness, orienting and executive control), may 
interact with dispositional mindfulness facets. 
Dependent 
variable 
R R2 Adjusted R2 F Predictor β t 
Orienting Accuracy .19 .03 .02 2.79** Observe -.25 -2.31** 
Orienting Accuracy .26 .06 .05 5.43** Acting with awareness -.31 -2.83** 
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Chapter 4 
 
Experiment 3 
 
 
1. Introduction 
    The whole idea of science is to find regularities in our complex observations of the 
world, to uncover lawfulness in the chaos. The replication of important findings by 
multiple independent investigators is fundamental to the accumulation of scientific 
evidence. In Pashler et al., (2012), authors argue that “the frequency with which errors 
appear in the psychological  literature  is  not  presently  known,  but  a  number  of  facts 
suggest  it  might  be  disturbingly  high”. For this reason, the main goal of this experiment 
is to replicate results from Luna et al., (In preparation). The authors designed a task 
(Attention Network Test for Interactions and Vigilance - executive and arousal 
components (ANTI-Vea) that could measure simultaneously the functioning of the typical 
attentional networks (phasic alertness, orienting and executive control), together with two 
different components of vigilance (executive –detection of infrequent signals-, and 
arousal –immediate reaction without response control-). Hence, it could be possible to 
dissociate the vigilance decrement observed for arousal vigilance (i.e., increased mean 
and/or variability in RT over time on task) from the vigilance decrement observed for the 
executive vigilance (i.e., reduced detection of infrequent targets with time on task). 
Further, this new task could solve the problems observed with the previous attempt to 
measure the executive vigilance performance together with the three attentional networks 
seen in previous studies (ANTI-V; Roca et al., 2011; Bukowski et al., 2015; Morales et 
al., 2015; Roca et al., 2012; Roca et al., 2013). In the present study, we used the vertical 
version of the task, in which the target was infrequently displaced vertically, that could 
be more suitable to observe the vigilance decrement phenomenon in executive vigilance 
(i.e., changes in performance across time on task), which was not observed with the 
previous version of the task. The discussion about whether the decrement in executive 
vigilance could be due either to a reduced sensitivity or to changes in response bias across 
time is long-standing. In Thomson et al., (2016), authors show that the vigilance 
decrement would more likely be an increase in the response bias towards a more 
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conservative criteria across time on task, rather than due to a sensitivity loss. Further, we 
also expected increases in both mean, variability measures of reaction time and lapses 
percentage in arousal vigilance across time on task. Finally, as in the study of Luna and 
collaborators, the inclusion of the arousal vigilance measure (in comparison with the 
previous ANTI-V version) would not have some relevant implications relating to the 
measurement of the three attentional networks functions. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
       Eighty participants took part in this study (range 18-35 years old with a mean of 
19.11) from University of Granada for extra class credit. Participants were recruited 
voluntarily. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and reported no 
clinical history of psychological or neurological problems. 
 
2.2. Procedure and design 
       All participants were tested individually in a quiet room after signing a consent form.  
 
2.2.1. Attention Network Test for Interactions and Vigilance - executive and arousal 
components (ANTI-Vea) 
           Participants were tested in a new version of the ANT task, named Attentional 
Networks Test for Interactions and Vigilance - executive and arousal components (ANTI-
Vea). This new task was designed to obtain two different measures of vigilance 
components in addition to the classical measures of the three attentional networks 
(alerting, orienting and executive control networks). Hence, in the ANTI-Vea design we 
can distinguish three different types of trials: ANTI (a flanker task, assessing the 
functioning of phasic alertness, orienting, executive control, and their interactions), 
executive vigilance (EV, detection of infrequent signals), and arousal vigilance (AV, 
immediate reaction without response control). A fixation cross appeared at the center of 
the screen for a random time between 400 and 1600 ms. In ANTI and EV trials, the 
fixation cross remained on the screen for the whole duration of trial whereas in the AV 
trials the fixation cross remained on the screen for 500 ms. Finally, all trials finished with 
the fixation point until total trial time achieved 4100 ms as a consequence participants 
were uncertain about the starting of next trial. In ANTI trials (60% of the trials), above or 
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below the fixation cross was presented a row of five arrows. Participants had to indicate 
the direction of central arrow ignoring the flanking ones by pressing on the keyboard 
letter “C” for left and “M” for right. The row of arrows was presented for 200 ms, and the 
participants’ responses were allowed up to 2000 ms. In order to measure the executive 
control network, in half of trials the central arrow pointed in the same direction of flankers 
(congruent condition) whereas in other half of trials the central arrow pointed in the 
opposite direction of flankers (incongruent condition). To analyze the functioning of the 
orienting network, a spatially non-predictive visual cue (a black asterisk for 50 ms) 
preceded the row of arrows 100 ms before its appearance. The visual cue could be 
presented in the same location of the row of arrows (valid cue condition, 1/3 times), in 
the opposite location (invalid cue condition, 1/3 times), or it could be not presented (no 
cue condition, 1/3 times). Finally, to have a direct measure of phasic alertness network, a 
50 ms warning auditory tone was presented in half of the trials for 500 ms before the row 
of arrows (tone condition) whereas in the other half of trials it was not presented at all (no 
tone condition). EV trials (20% of trials) had the same design as ANTI trials except that 
the central arrow, in the row of arrows, was vertically (either above or below) displaced 
from the center. Participants had to detect these infrequent stimuli, ignoring the direction 
of the central arrow, by pressing “space bar” on the keyboard. In AV trials, conditions of 
tone, visual cue or arrows were not presented. A red milliseconds down counter appeared 
in the center of the screen starting at 1000 and going down up to 0. Participants had to 
stop the counter, as fast as they could, by pressing any key on the keyboard. As in the 
other trials, responses were allowed up to 2000 ms since the down counter appearance 
(Figure 1). Participants were told to focus their attention on the fixation cross at every 
moment. Standard instructions were given for the three type of trials gradually. Starting 
with ANTI trials, a first practice block of 16 trials with visual feedback was run. After 
that, instructions about EV trials were given followed by a practice block of 32 trials with 
visual feedback, with a random presentation of 16 ANTI and 16 EV trials. In the end, 
instructions of AV trials were given, including an example of the milliseconds down 
counter. A last randomized practice block of 48 trials with visual feedback was presented, 
including 16 trials of each type. To ensure the correct understanding of instructions, an 
additional practice block of 40 randomized trials (24 ANTI, 8 EV and 8 AV i.e., half of 
one experimental block) without feedback was presented. Participants were told to 
consult the researcher for any doubt before starting the experimental blocks. The 
experimental section was composed of 6 blocks of 80 randomly presented trials (48 
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ANTI, 16 EV, and 16 AV per block). The 48 ANTI trials had the following factorial 
design: 2 (Warning: No tone/Tone) X 3 (Visual Cue: Invalid/No Cue/Valid) X 2 
(Congruency: Congruent/Incongruent). The duration of the task was approximately 60 
min. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Stimuli sequence for ANTI trials, EV trials and AV trials in ANTI-Vea (Luna 
et al., In preparation) 
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2.3. Data analysis and results 
        For the ANTI trials, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for both RT and 
Errors %, including Warning signal (No tone/Tone), Visual cue (Invalid/No cue/Valid), 
and Congruency (Congruent/Incongruent) as within-participants factors. For RT analysis 
only correct responses and with RT between 200 ms and 1500 ms were included. Further, 
in order to analyze EV performance, Signal-Detection Theory (SDT) metrics were 
calculated for Hits (the proportion of infrequent signals as displaced targets) detected 
correctly, False Alarms (FA, the proportion of infrequent stimuli key response given to 
frequent stimuli as ANTI trials), d’ (index of sensitivity) and Beta (β, response bias). 
Then, six repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted separately including task blocks 
as within-participants factors, one for each dependent variable. Finally, for the AV 
measures, repeated measures ANOVAs of mean RTs and Lapses (late responses) were 
conducted separately including task blocks as a within-participants factor. Lapses for 
ANTI-Vea task were defined as responses larger than 600 ms (Luna et al., In 
preparation). For RT results, significant main effects were found for the three within-
participants variables: Warning signal [ F(1, 79) = 158,53, p < .001], Visual cue [ F(2, 
158) = 134,99, p < .001] and Congruency [ F(1, 79) = 209,64, p < .001]. As in previous 
study using ANTI task, all the interactions between conditions, except the three-way 
interaction between the within-participants factors, were significant in our experiment. 
For Accuracy (Errors %) results, significant main effects were found for the three within-
participants variables: Warning signal [ F(1, 79) = 20,572, p < .001], Visual cue [ F(2, 
158) = 5,2039, p < .01] and Congruency [ F(1, 79) = 5,4476, p < .05]. As in previous 
study using ANTI task, no significant interactions between the within-participants factors 
were found in our experiment. For EV results, a significant main effect of blocks was 
observed for both Hits [ F(5, 390) = 14,755, p < .001] and FAs [ F(5, 390) = 2,46, p < 
.05]. Figure 2 shows that both Hits and FAs tend to decrease linearly with time on task. 
A significant main effect of blocks was only found for Response Bias (β) [ F(5, 390) = 
5,2562, p < .001], while Sensitivity (d’) did not change significantly across blocks [ F(5, 
390) = 4,9181, p < .001]. Figure 3 shows that Sensitivity did not change with time on task 
whereas Response Bias tends to increase. For AV results, significant main effects of 
blocks were found in the two repeated measures ANOVAs:  mean RT [ F(5, 390) = 
2.3472, p < .05] and Lapses percentage [ F(5, 390) = 5,1484, p < .001]. Figure 4 shows 
that mean RT and Lapses percentage tend to increase linearly with time on task. 
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Figure 2. Executive Vigilance performance per blocks in ANTI-Vea task: Hits and FA  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Executive Vigilance performance per blocks in ANTI-Vea task: d’ and Beta  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Arousal Vigilance performance per blocks in ANTI-Vea task: RT and Lapses  
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3. Discussion 
    The new attentional task (ANTI-Vea) proposed by Luna and collaborators would 
dissociate two different components of vigilance performance: one more ‘executive’ that 
is implicated in the detection of infrequent signals across time and another more involved 
in sustaining a tonic level of arousal through time but without a response control over 
stimuli. At the same time, the authors aimed to improve the measuring of the executive 
component of vigilance originally seen in Roca et al., (2011). Further, they expected to 
still find the typical functioning for phasic alertness, orienting and executive control 
(Callejas et al., 2004). The vertical version of ANTI-Vea task seems to resolve all the 
difficulties in measuring executive vigilance performance. Moreover, with this new task 
is now possible to approach the cognitive mechanisms that underlies the executive 
vigilance decrement across time, something that could not be observed in the ANTI-V 
studies (Roca et al., 2012). That is, the decrement of vigilance is seen, by many studies, 
as a loss in sensitivity. However, in ANTI-Vea vertical version, where subjects resolved 
three tasks simultaneously with a high cognitive load, it was not observed any change in 
sensitivity across time. Indeed, both hits and FA tend to decrease over time and this 
decrement was characterized as a change in response bias towards a more conservative 
criterion. This results could be interpreted as the confirmation of the empirical 
demonstration by Thomson et al., (2016) about the causes of the executive vigilance 
decrement. In addition, results may support the idea of the independence of vigilance 
components as proposed by Luna and collaborators. The time responses for executive 
vigilance did not showed any decrement, in contrast to the arousal vigilance measure. 
Sarter et al., (2001) proposed that vigilance or sustained attention may be thought up as 
separated from the “arousal” components of attention. They dissociated vigilance as a 
behavioral function for detection of unusual targets, which is supported by a top-down 
functioning of the cholinergic neural system whereas the “arousal” of attention did not 
involve a behaviorally component even if it could be necessary for the development of 
vigilance across time by the bottom-up innervations of the noradrenergic system. In Luna 
et al, (In preparation) as in the present study, both components of vigilance are 
independent from one another. The authors support this idea specifying what the type of 
responses are particular of each component, and we could observe the size and type of 
decrement for each of them. Finally, future neuroimaging and behavioral data could help 
to highlight the independence of these vigilance components.  
 55 
 
Experiment 4 
 
 
1. Introduction 
     Mindfulness could be described as “awareness that arises through paying attention, on 
purpose, in the present moment, non-judgementally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Mindfulness 
means living in the moment and awakening to your current experience, rather than 
dwelling on the past or anticipating the future. The 39-item Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) has been developed as a reliable and valid 
comprehensive instrument for assessing different aspects of mindfulness in community 
and student samples. FFMQ questionnaire appears to be the most inclusive assessment of 
mindfulness at present. The Attention Network Test for Interactions and Vigilance - 
executive and arousal components (ANTI-Vea) measure simultaneously the functioning 
of the typical attentional networks (phasic alertness, orienting and executive control), 
together with two different components of vigilance (executive –detection of infrequent 
signals-, and arousal –immediate reaction without response control-) (see Experiment 1, 
for more details). The aim of this study was to investigate whether and how FFMQ 
mindfulness facets interacted with attentional performance using ANTI-Vea task. The 
inclusion of a new measure of vigilance performance (arousal component) could change 
again our mental set towards external stimuli (i.e., warning signal and milliseconds down 
counter). More generally, whether and how there is an interaction between the two 
mindfulness facets relative to attention (Observe and Acting with awareness) and the 
attentional performance. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
       Forty participants took part in this study (range 17-35 years old with a mean of 20.09) 
from University of Granada for extra class credit. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and reported no clinical history of psychological or 
neurological problems. 
 
2.2. Assessment 
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       The Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006) is a self-report 
measure assessing a general tendency to be mindful. This scale is composed of 39 items 
that are divided into five subscales or facets: observing, describing, acting with 
awareness, non-judging, and non-reactivity of experience. The Observing facet measures 
the tendency to notice or attend to internal and external experiences, such as sensations, 
emotions, cognitions, sounds, sights, and smells. Example items are “I remain present 
with sensations and feelings even when they are unpleasant or painful” and “I pay 
attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars passing.” Describing 
measures the tendency to describe and label these experiences with words. Items include 
“I’m good at finding the words to describe my feelings” and “My natural tendency is to 
put my experiences into words.” The Acting with awareness facet refers to bringing full 
awareness and undivided attention to current activity or experiences. Example items are 
“I rush through activities without being really attentive to them” and “I find it difficult to 
stay focused on what’s happening in the present.” Non-judging refers to a non-evaluative 
stance toward inner experiences. Items include “I tend to evaluate whether my perceptions 
are right or wrong” and “I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I 
shouldn’t feel them.” Non-reactivity measures the tendency to allow thoughts and feelings 
to come and go, without getting caught up in them or carried away by them. Items include 
“Usually when I have distressing thoughts or images, I step back and am aware of the 
thought or image without getting taken over by it.” The subscales include eight items, 
except the non-reactivity scale, which is composed of seven items. Each subscale is a 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (never or very rarely true) to 5 (very often or always true). 
 
2.3. Materials and procedure 
       Procedure was identical to Experiment 3 except that trait/state mindfulness was 
assessed with the Spanish version of Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ, 
Cebolla et. al., 2012). 
 
2.4. Data analysis and results 
      First, in our results we replicated all the main previous findings with the ANTI-Vea 
task (Luna et al., In preparation). As in the Experiment 2, these main effects of attentional 
indexes are not reported here, as they fall beyond the aim of the present study. Then, we 
computed the correlations between Observe and Acting with awareness and the ANTI-
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Vea scores: both RT and Accuracy scores, Executive Vigilance and Arousal Vigilance 
indexes. Additionally, we conducted a series of multiple regression analyses, with the 
ANTI-Vea scores as dependent variables and the FFMQ facets scores as predictors. For 
Observe, the first analysis revealed significant correlations with Orienting RT, r = .42, p 
< .05 while for Acting with awareness we found a negative significant correlation only 
with Alerting RT, r = -0.40, p < .05. All other correlation analyses of ANTI scores were 
not significant (Table 1). On Executive Vigilance performance, we found a significant 
correlation only for Observe with Hits, r = 0.33, p < .05. All other correlation analyses of 
Executive Vigilance indexes were not significant (Table 2). Further, we did not found 
significant correlations for Arousal Vigilance indexes with any of the FFMQ facets 
considered. As reported in Table 3, we found a corresponding pattern of results for the 
regression analyses. The regression revealed that Observe significantly predicted the 
dependent variable Orienting RT, β = .39, p < .05. Moreover, Acting with awareness is a 
predictor of Alerting RT, β = .30, p < .05 and Observe is a predictor of the dependent 
variable Hits. All other regression analyses were not significant and not reported in Table 
3.  
 
Table 1. Correlation results: ANTI 
**p < .05 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation results: Executive Vigilance indexes 
**p < .05 
 
 
Alerting RT Orienting RT Executive Control RT 
Observe -0.14 0.40** 0.10 
Acting with awareness 0.42** -0.29 0.15 
 Alerting Accuracy Orienting Accuracy Executive Control Accuracy 
Observe -0.10 0.10 -0.07 
Acting with awareness -0.19 0.09 0.22 
 Hits FA d’ Beta 
Observe .33** .03 .27 .00 
Acting with awareness -.04 -.04 -.20 .25 
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Table 3. Regression analyses results 
**p < .05 
 
3. Discussion 
    The aim of the study was to investigate the relation between FFMQ mindfulness 
questionnaire and a new task developed from ANT. ANTI-Vea include two different 
measure of vigilance performance: one more ‘executive’ that is implicated in the 
detection of infrequent signals across time and another more involved in sustaining a tonic 
level of arousal through time but without a response control over stimuli (Luna et al., In 
preparation). Observe facet interaction with attentional networks found in Di Francesco 
et al., (2016) was found again using ANTI-Vea task. ANTI-Vea task elicits a more open 
task set than ANTI-V task. More specifically, Observe facet measures the tendency to 
notice or attend to internal and external experiences, such as sensations, emotions, 
cognitions, sounds, sights, and smells. External stimuli (warning signal and milliseconds 
down counter) affected again participants’ Observe facet. Further, Acting with awareness 
facet interaction with attentional performance found in Di Francesco et al., (2016) was 
found again using ANTI-Vea task. Acting with awareness facet refers to bringing full 
awareness and undivided attention to current activity or experiences. A different task 
could elicits a different mind-set in terms of involvement in the task. Future studies could 
better understand whether and how there is an interaction between FFMQ mindfulness 
facets and attentional performance using different task (i.e., memory task) together with 
attentional tasks. Finally, dispositional mindfulness could help to understand how our 
experience is centred in the present moment and the current activity. Although some 
people are naturally wired toward this type of keen self-awareness and present-focus, 
many studies suggest it can be cultivated by anyone. That is, individuals seem to differ in 
their natural tendency to be aware of their moment to moment experience in an open and 
non-judgmental way. Further research in larger populations is needed to confirm these 
Dependent 
variable 
R R2 Adjusted R2 F Predictor β t 
Alerting RT .42 .18 .15 8.34** Acting with awareness .41 2.75** 
Orienting RT .40 .16 .14 7.38** Observe .37 2.52** 
Global Hits .32 .10 .08 4.58** Observe .32 2.10** 
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findings, which may help shed further light on the mechanism of the beneficial effects of 
dispositional mindfulness. 
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General Discussion 
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate whether and how mindfulness meditation 
could affect the attentional system. Most of the studies reviewed found significantly 
higher attentional performance in long term mindfulness meditators when compared with 
matched controls on different domains of attention as reported by meaningful results in 
this direction (Chiesa et al., 2011). On the other hand, the proportion of mindfulness-
based interventions with statistically significant results may overstate what actually 
occurs in practice (Coronado-Montoya et al., 2016). Indeed, Heredia et al., (2017) found 
that a trained group with mindfulness intervention improved in subjective psychological 
wellness and emotional regulation, but not in attentional performance. In our Experiment 
1, we also found effectiveness of MBSR training but no improvements in attentional 
performance. Mindfulness protocols used in the literature (i.e., MBSR, MBCT, short-term 
meditation or long-term meditation) could be unrelated to improvements in attentional 
processing. Lastly, it will be important for future research to utilize standardized cognitive 
measures so as to allow for comparisons across studies as well as comparing mindfulness 
groups with active control groups and other intervention programs. In Experiment 3, we 
replicated results from Luna et al., (In preparation). The authors developed a new task 
(ANTI-Vea) that could measure simultaneously the functioning of the typical attentional 
networks (phasic alertness, orienting and executive control), together with two different 
components of vigilance (executive –detection of infrequent signals-, and arousal –
immediate reaction without response control-). Furthermore, with this new task, it is 
possible to dissociate the vigilance decrement observed for arousal vigilance (i.e., 
increased mean and/or variability in RT over time on task) from the vigilance decrement 
observed for the executive vigilance (i.e., reduced detection of infrequent targets with 
time on task). Finally, in Experiment 2 and 4, we found different results regarding the 
relationship between FFMQ mindfulness questionnaire and two attentional tasks: ANTI-
V and ANTI-Vea. It could possible that different attentional trials may change overall task 
set. The ANTI-V task, because of its difficulty (i.e., executive vigilance trials together 
with attentional networks trials), may involve a more deeply attentional performance. On 
the contrary, the ANTI-Vea elicits a different mind-set in terms of involvement in the task 
in an open and non-judgmental way.  
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Limitations 
Some limitations affected our studies. First, monitoring of MBSR daily activity could be 
improved since volunteers might have not constantly practice mindfulness exercises at 
home. Second, in our studies, we used FFMQ mindfulness questionnaire that is one of 
several assessments used in the literature. The development of a unique mindfulness 
questionnaire could solve actual problems relative to its dispositional measure. Third, it 
could also be useful to use different cognitive tasks (i.e., memory tasks) together with 
attentional tasks. Fourth, there is the need to explore different samples in both clinical 
and non-clinical populations. Future studies could achieve these aims and help us broaden 
our horizons to better understand the nature of attentional processing, its role in human 
functioning and its optimization. In addition, since neither current studies nor previous 
studies using FFMQ found correlations between mindfulness facets and Executive 
Control network it could be needed to develop a subscale that permits to measure 
cognitive control as a new facet of mindfulness meditation. Mindfulness training may be 
used to change habitual cognitive patterns of responding with intentional, flexible 
responses that are voluntarily chosen rather than automatic (Heeren et al., 2009).  
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, interest in the psychological and neuroscientific investigation of 
mindfulness meditation has increased markedly over the past two decades. This resulting 
field of research is still in its early stages, and concomitant to its "green age" we need to 
explore deeply the mechanisms that underlie the effects of meditation. As suggested by 
Tang et al., (2015), if supported by rigorous research studies, the practice of mindfulness 
meditation might be promising for the treatment of clinical disorders and might facilitate 
the cultivation of a healthy mind and increased well-being. Moreover, attention is central 
to many higher order cognitive operations, influenced by dysfunction of normal aging, 
and impaired in many diseases and disorders. Consequently, improving attentional 
performance with training methods could be potentially beneficial in a wide range of 
domains.  
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